The primary threat posed by an Article V Convention is that of a confrontation between Congress and such a Convention. Upon Congress devolves the duty of calling a Convention on application of the legislatures of two-thirds of the states, and approving and transmitting to the states for ratification the text of any amendment or amendments agreed upon by the convention. The discretion with which Congress may discharge this duty is pregnant with danger even under the most salutary conditions.

In the event of a dispute between Congress and the Convention over the congressional role in permitting the Convention to proceed, the Supreme Court would almost certainly be asked to serve as referee. Because the Court might feel obliged to protect the interests of the states in the amendment process, it cannot be assumed that the Court would automatically decline to become involved on the ground that the dispute raised a nonjusticiable political question, even if Congress sought to delegate resolution of such a dispute to itself. Depending upon the political strength of the parties to the dispute, a decision to abstain would amount to a judgment for one side or the other. Like an official judgment on the merits, such a practical resolution of the controversy would leave the Court an enemy either of Congress or of the Convention and the states that brought it into being.

A decision upholding against challenge by one or more states an action taken by Congress under Article V would be poorly received by the states involved. Truly disastrous, however, would be any result of a confrontation between the Supreme Court and the states over the validity of an amendment proposed by their Convention. Yet the convention process could, quite imaginably, give rise to judicial challenges that would cast the states into just such a conflict with the Supreme Court — despite congressional attempts to exclude such disputes from the Court’s purview.

At a minimum, therefore, the federal judiciary, including the Supreme Court, will have to resolve the inevitable disputes over which branch and level of government may be entrusted to decide each of the many questions left open by Article V.

The only possible way to circumvent the problematic prospect of such judicial resolution is to avoid use of the Convention device altogether until its reach has been authoritatively clarified in the only manner that could yield definitive answers without embroiling the federal judiciary in the quest: through an amendment to Article V itself.