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COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Public Hearing - House Bill 1942 Select Subcommittee of the Transportation Committee

Pages 1 through 130

Room 302

South Office Building Harrisburg, Pennsylvania

Tuesday, October 13, 1992

Met, pursuant to notice, at 9:36 a.m.

BEFORE:

REPRESENTATIVE WILLIAM LLOYD, Chairman REPRESENTATIVE THOMAS TIGUE REPRESENTATIVE RUSSELL FAIRCHILD REPRESENTATIVE GREGORY SNYDER REPRESENTATIVE VICTOR LESCOVITZ REPRESENTATIVE JOSEPH PRESTON REPRESENTATIVE RICHARD HESS

ALSO PRESENT:

PAUL E. PARSELLS PAUL J. LANDIS

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PROCEEDINGS

CHAIRMAN LLOYD: The meeting will come to order. We are here this morning to hear testimony on House Bill 1942, legislation introduced by Representative Tom Murphy regarding the administrative suspension of drivers' licenses for DUI offenses.

The Committee had considered this legislation several months ago. Many questions had arisen with regard to the need for this legislation, the cost of this legislation, and what we would like to do this morning is to hear testimony from people who have an interest to help us in making a decision as to whether this legislation should go forward, and, if it should, whether there are changes which need to be made.

Before we hear from the first witness, we have received testimony in writing from the Pennsylvania AAA Federation and also testimony in writing from the Century Council, Ambassador John Gavin. They are not able to present oral testimony this morning, and these, without objection, will be accepted into the record.

(Whereupon, the written testimony of the Pennsylvania AAA Federation and The Century Council follows:)

600 North Third Street • P.O. Box 2865 • Harrisburg PA 17105-2865 • (717) 238-7192 FAX (717) 238-6574

October 13, 1992

The Honorable Joseph A. Petrarca, Chairman Pennsylvania House of Representatives Transportation Committee Room 202, South Office Building Harrisburg, PA 17120

> Re: House Transportation Committee Public Hearing Regarding House Bill 1942. P.N. 2342

Dear Representative Petrarca:

The Pennsylvania AAA Federation hereby submits the attached research regarding the above-referenced issue. As Richard Gmerek, the Federation's governmental representative, indicated to you and your staff, we would appreciate it if this letter and the attached research would be included as a matter of record for the above-referenced public hearing on October 13, 1992.

The stated policy of the Federation supports administrative suspension revocation of licenses when probable cause exists that driving under the influence of alcohol or other drugs has occurred. AAA endorses administrative license suspension laws allowing police officers to physically take possession of motorists' driver's licenses for probable cause and to replace them with limited, temporary permits and notices of suspension, providing that due process is assured through prompt administrative hearings and appeals to the courts on the merits of the charge. In addition, the Federation respectfully urges this Committee and the General Assembly to adopt an administrative suspension law which maintains statutory language that assures that motorists with substance abuse problems receive proper evaluation and referral to authorized drug and alcohol treatment programs.

We trust that this research which we are providing and the stated policy of the Federation will be of assistance to you and your Committee at the Public Hearing on October 13. At the same time, if there is any other information that is needed or if there are any questions regarding the Federation's policy on the

Page 2

issue of administrative suspension or the research which we have provided, please do not hesitate to contact me at (717) 238-7192 or Richard Gmerek at (717) 238-2900.

Sincerely,

Elaine Farrell, CAE Executive Director

EF/11p

Enclosures

cc: Paul Parsells, Executive Director
House Transportation Committee
Richard Gmerek, Tucker Arensberg, P.C.



STATEMENT OF AMBASSADOR JOHN GAVIN CHAIRMAN THE CENTURY COUNCIL

SUBMITTED TO THE HEARING OF THE SELECT SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE TRANSPORTATION COMMITTEE OF THE PENNSYLVANIA HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

HARRISBURG, PENNSYLVANIA

OCTOBER 13, 1992

Chairman Petrarca, distinguished members of the Transportation Committee:

My name is John Gavin. I am Chairman of The Century Council, a nonprofit organization dedicated to reducing alcohol abuse and misuse across the Untied States.

I am pleased to add the strong support of The Century Council for the Pennsylvania House of Representative's efforts to adopt administrative license revocation (ALR) legislation as provided in House Bill 1942.

Publicly announced in May, 1991, the Council is funded by more than 400 concerned distillers, vintners, brewers and licensed beverage wholesalers who are dedicated to combatting the abuse of their products.

We at the Council have chosen to commit our resources to the two areas of abuse that are of greatest concern to the American public: drunken driving and underage drinking problems.

Materials describing The Century Council and its programs appear as an attachment to my testimony. Not all licensed beverage companies support us. A list of those who do is included.

Pennsylvania was one of the first states in the nation to place our "Front Lines" retail point-of-sale materials in its state liquor stores to help prevent attempted purchase of alcohol by minors. Samples of these materials, which we are making available free-of-charge to retailers, are attached.

Nationally, more than 100,000 concerned wholesalers and retailers have ordered more than 1.5 million pieces of these materials — including posters, buttons, employee pledge forms and the like — and we are receiving highly favorable comments about their effectiveness.

In addition to helping prevent underage access to alcohol at the point of sale, The Century Council is also combatting drunken driving by supporting passage of ALR laws in the 19 states that do not have them. We are adding our efforts to those of concerned citizens, insurers, government officials and others across the country to urge the adoption of tough uniform ALR laws. Thirty-one states and the District of Columbia already have ALR on their books. We were pleased to be involved in coalitions this year that helped enact ALR in Nebraska and New Hampshire. I respectfully urge that Pennsylvania waste no time in becoming the 32nd member of this club.

I doubt I am the first person to make this point, but it is so vitally important and bears repeating: across the country highway safety experts report that ALR is the single most effective step that state governments can take to attack the problem of drunken driving.

Research shows that ALR is a highly effective deterrent to drunken driving because it imposes stiff, swift and sure sanctions against DUI offenders. It gives the police increased motivation to enforce DUI laws because they know that the arrest will stick. It helps relieve court congestion by removing incentives to manipulate the system.

Arguments have been raised against ALR laws, but in our view, they do not hold up to close scrutiny.

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Arguments have been raised against ALR laws, but in our view, they do not hold up to close scrutiny.

Opponents of ALR have suggested, for example, that it is inconsistent with due process of law. However, ALR has consistently survived judicial review and was ruled constitutional by the U.S. Supreme Court. Courts have ruled that due process is protected by the assurance of a speedy administrative hearing that allows individuals to contest the facts of the arrest.

Opponents also claim that by depriving working men and women of their licenses, ALR can cost people their jobs. But in fact, research in several states has shown that ALR rarely leads to job loss. Moreover, by reducing the consequences of job loss and incapacitation that result from drunken driving accidents, ALR makes a net positive economic contribution.

I am aware of few anti-drunken driving laws that have been so thoroughly researched and scrutinized as has ALR over the past decade. And, to repeat, study after study reinforces the fundamental fact the <u>ALR WORKS</u>.

That is why The Century Council is committed to see ALR become law across the land.

The Century Council today respectfully adds its voice to those who call on Pennsylvania to adopt an effective administrative license revocation law. ALR is one important way to help put a halt to the drunken-driving tragedies that imperil your state's roads.

Thank you for the opportunity to share the views of The Century Council on this important issue.

 CHAIRMAN LLOYD: The first witness who is here this morning to testify is the District Attorney of Lackawanna County. Michael Barrasse.

Mr. Barrasse.

MR. BARRASSE: Good morning.

Law enforcement no longer treats drunk driving as a victimless crime. No longer are police officers simply giving drunk drivers a ride home. No longer are they enabling the drunk driver by condoning his or her conduct. Statistics throughout the Commonwealth show that law enforcement has not only stepped up its enforcement of DUI, but, in fact, in many areas have tripled and quadrupled the number of arrests in the last four years. With this dramatic rise in enforcement, certain inherent problems have come to surface.

The criminal justice system has not come to grips with the manner in which to handle repeat offenders through effective treatment and punishment, nor is our criminal justice system equipped to handle the housing of the drunk offenders. However, there lies a problem of equally great importance, and that is the arresting of an individual for DUI homicide or DUI and allowing that person tomorrow to get back in the same vehicle in which he utilized to commit the heinous act the evening before.

While the comparison seems drastic, what really is

the difference between allowing an individual to drive a car after committing a homicide by motor vehicle DUI than the giving of a hand gun back to a defendant in a murder case following his slaughter of young children?

When you consider that it is the increased enforcement that is now allowing law enforcement to be aware of the identity of drunk offenders, it now becomes law enforcement and the Commonwealth's responsibility to protect innocent victims from this drunk driver who is already identified by law enforcement.

It is, therefore, ironic that the very enforcement procedures that have shown to work so effectively are also responsible for the Commonwealth's allowing repeat offenders back on the road within hours after their DUI conduct.

Since police officers are no longer closing their eyes to the DUI offenders, nor is it accepted thinking that the offender just needs a ride home and he will be okay, the police officers are now left with an administrative procedure that often fails to keep up with their enforcement procedures.

In Lackawanna County, within the last year arrests for DUI have tripled the figures of 1989. In 1992 there will be approximately 1,200 DUI arrests, while in 1989 there were approximately 390. The remarkable statistic,

 however, is not the increase of arrests but the number of second, third and fourth offenders within this last year-and-one-half period. Many of the offenders are not through the criminal justice system on the first DUI when they commit the second and subsequent offenses.

It is frustrating for a police officer who had competently and responsibly carried out his duties in arresting an individual for DUI to see that same person out on the highways the following day or week, again DUI, with no means to prevent this person from driving the same vehicle he was originally arrested for driving DUI. This problem is carried to the extreme when a police officer, or, even worse, a victim of a DUI sees the offender driving while this person is still recovering from injuries received.

The worse scenario is that of the family of a victim of a DUI homicide who knows that the drunk driver that killed their daughter is still driving on the highways.

Todd Reaser was arrested on September 8, 1990, for a homicide DUI that occurred on Mulberry Street in the City of Scranton. Mr. Reaser was prosecuted and was found guilty of Homicide by Motor Vehicle by a jury trial on March 15, 1991.

After the verdict, the defendant filed post-trial motions. Since that date, the post-trial motions have been

decided and sentencing is scheduled for October of this year. Technically, he, therefore, has not been "convicted" of this crime until he is sentenced. The DL-21 (Attachment A) report, therefore, has not been forwarded to the Pennsylvania Department of Transportation. However, as you can see by the attached inquiry (Attachment B) on Todd Reaser's license, he still has no suspension for this most heinous crime in which a nineteen year old girl died because of his drunk driving.

As is the case with defendant John Gomba, who on January 25, 1992, while driving under the influence, killed an off-duty Scranton policeman. Mr. Gomba had been prosecuted in 1977 for a DUI, had his license restored, and today, while awaiting trial, still drives without a suspension on his license (Attachment C).

As can be seen by the attached list (Attachment D) of repeat DUI offenders, the number of cases which this applies to reaches easily into the hundreds. The need for such a bill is clear upon review of horror cases like this throughout the Commonwealth.

In view of House Bill 1942, however, there are several questions which are both procedural and technical in nature. 1534.1(B) requires a police officer forward to the department within 24 hours of arrest a sworn or affirmed report numerating all information relative to the

enforcement action. The phrase "24 hours of arrest" should be changed to the "24 hours from time of filing complaint." This would alleviate any questions as to those individuals that are taken from the scene or into custody, therefore, technically under arrest but yet released and the paper not filed for several days later.

Further, there is no indication as to what penalty will occur if a police officer does not forward such information within 24 hours of arrest. The question that begs, therefore, would be: does the driver not receive a penalty because of the fact that the officer did not file within the prescribed time?

Section 1534.1(B)2 states: "On behalf of the department, the police officer directing the administration of the chemical test under Section 1547 relating to chemical testing to determine the amount of alcohol or controlled substance shall serve immediate notice of suspension personally on a person whose test results indicate an amount of alcohol by weight in the blood of .10 percent or greater. There are several procedural problems with this.

First, in Lackawanna County there are two DUI
Processing Centers. At the processing centers, there is a
phlebotomist present at both sites drawing the blood. This
blood is then transferred to Clinical Laboratories. Test

results are received approximately three to four days after the blood is taken. The police officer directing the administration of a chemical test, therefore, is unable to have knowledge as to the test results, and, therefore, would not be able to give them at the time the person is taken in. This report and notice procedure would place a cumbersome responsibility upon the officer to now go out upon receiving the test results and serve personal notice on each DUI offender.

On October 2 and 3, 1992, 25 individuals were processed through the DUI centers in Lackawanna County, of which 23 were over the legal limit of .10 percent. This information was not received until October 7, 1992, and with the passing of House Bill 1942 in its present state, it would require the police officers to go out immediately and serve all 23 of those individuals with such notification. This is not feasible.

While I believe that the period of suspension should start immediately for the drunk driver for the period of time as stated, and that those who refuse chemical testing should also have their license suspended immediately, I believe it is of equal importance that the license not be given back to the offender until they have been clinically evaluated.

The Legislature did a splendid job in dealing with

repeat offenders under Act 122. Don't let the first time offender receive his license back until he, too, is evaluated, and, if treatment is recommended, until he completes treatment. Waiting for the subsequent offenses is too late once we identify that the person is a drunk driver.

The Commonwealth issues the license to a person of age and competency to drive. Once the Commonwealth identifies that this person is a drunk driver, it is the Commonwealth's responsibility to withhold that driver's license until such time that the driver proves that he is competent (SOBER) to drive again.

Thank you.

(Whereupon, the attachments to Mr. Barrasse's written testimony follow:)

CHAIRMAN LLOYD: Thank you.

One of the changes which this legislation would make is to make it easier for the government to take a license based on the evidence in the case. Under current law it is necessary to get a conviction in a criminal court, proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Under this legislation it would be possible to administratively take the license on a finding of preponderance of the evidence.

In order to understand whether that is a significant change, it would be helpful if you could give us some indication of the number of prosecutions which you don't bring or which you lose because you don't think you can prove it beyond a reasonable doubt, but which you think we could get a suspension if all we had to do was prove preponderance of the evidence.

MR. BARRASSE: I think we have recognized that -going through the criminal justice system with a case to a
test of beyond a reasonable doubt, we have now drawn up
guidelines such that below .10 we recommend a policeman
make an arrest, or actually filing of a complaint. Then we
review each arrest afterwards to see whether or not the
police officer feels, along with the assistant specially
assigned for DUI cases, feel they have enough evidence to
get beyond a reasonable doubt.

If the case is such in which it is between .05

and .10, and there is an accident where there are some other problems with the case, we will usually pursue the arrest. If it is less than .10, though, and we feel that the presumption is not with us, and there is difficulty in proving it beyond a reasonable doubt, our standard, therefore, is that we do not go ahead with the DUI offense because of the responsibility that we have before the court.

We feel that if you did have a preponderance of the evidence, as compared to beyond a reasonable doubt, the taking of a license would be much, much easier if the proof was given. That we cannot do in criminal court. We could do that in an administrative hearing. And we feel that because of the fact that it is a privilege, a license, that it is the correct way to go.

CHAIRMAN LLOYD: Under the bill, however, we would not be giving the right to take a license administratively for under .10. That would have to be an amendment.

So I guess, to zero in on my question, assuming that the bill stays the way it is, that you lose your license only if you are at .10 or above, how many additional suspensions would we get that way with preponderance of the evidence that we do not get now through the criminal justice system?

MR. BARRASSE: I could not give you a specific

However, I could say to you that I feel that the number. percentages there would have to be between five and ten percent of the total numbers. And while that may not sound like a great number. I believe that our repeat offenders show that it is. When you have hundreds of cases a year that are repeat offenders, I think that the fact that we are now taking the license immediately would have a greater impact than that five or ten percent, because now we're talking about second and subsequent offenses. So I don't think we have to narrow in on which prosecutions go forward as compared to how is it going to affect further driving. And if we have those that are already in the 15 to 20 percent total that we believe are definitely, in Lackawanna County alone, being DUI offenders, then we feel that that is a very substantial amount and has to be addressed immediately.

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CHAIRMAN LLOYD: The second issue that I want to ask about before opening it up to other members is some people felt, when we considered this bill before, that this was an unnecessary cost to the Commonwealth. You have suggested that we might get five to ten percent more suspensions, and that may change their perception.

But in terms of the time, unless we lengthen -- and there is a proposal in this bill to lengthen the minimum suspension from one to three months, but unless we lengthen

the maximum suspension period, we are really dealing with a time machine problem. We're going to take the person's license sooner, but he is going to get it back sooner.

You suggest that we shouldn't give it back at all until we go through some other procedures. That is not in the bill at the present time.

Assume with me that we were going to focus strictly on the bill the way it is. What, if any, benefit is there to taking the person's license now and giving it back to him in a year, as opposed to taking it six months and giving it back 18 months from now?

MR. BARRASSE: Well, even though it may not seem logical -- I'm not sure what the state's statistics are -- we find that our repeat offenders are usually within a very short period of time; that persons that are drunk driving don't necessarily wait until their ARD period is over with or their suspension time is over with; that, in fact, within the next three, six months, we have second and third offenses occurring.

Because of that I think the most effective way is to take that license immediately upon the person finding that they are .10 or above. But I think for the Legislature to ignore the fact that the numbers that we have don't call for some type of clinical evaluation is really -- we are putting the problem aside, and all you're going to be doing

then is taking the license and not addressing the real problem; that is that you do have these huge numbers that are second, third and fourth time offenders.

CHAIRMAN LLOYD: Other members who have questions?

REPRESENTATIVE FAIRCHILD: On your repeat DUI

offenders attachment --

MR. BARRASSE: Yes.

REPRESENTATIVE FAIRCHILD: -- the names there, is that a compilation of over a --

MR. BARRASSE: It's a year-and-a-half. It should be to the beginning of 1991 -- 1991 to present. The blood alcohol on the right is the last test that we had on file.

As you can see there, there's over -- I believe there's over 120 there, and that was only what we were able to do on Thursday of last week.

REPRESENTATIVE FAIRCHILD: Were these people that were -- obviously repeat DUIs, but were these people who had their license in hand and were arrested, or is this just a list of repeat DUI offenders?

MR. BARRASSE: The most that we're able to show, almost all of these -- there were only two that we're able to show that had refusals, that did not have their license on them at the time. So in the year-and-a-half period we're over 120 in just a cursory review of our files.

REPRESENTATIVE FAIRCHILD: And 118 of those had

existing licenses?

MR. BARRASSE: Had existing licenses and were out with that license. As you can see, many of them are third and fourth time offenders.

REPRESENTATIVE FAIRCHILD: Just for instance, the fourth DUI, they had a license?

MR. BARRASSE: Had a license, and it wasn't until the last time, when Mr. Woodbridge had a refusal on the final one, he thought he would -- because the first couple were in excess of .10, he thought this time he would refuse it and that he would stand a better chance, and he's taking it to trial.

REPRESENTATIVE FAIRCHILD: What kind of previous suspensions did the judge issue in the Woodbridge --

MR. BARRASSE: That's my point to you, is it never made it to court. We never got that far in the criminal justice system.

REPRESENTATIVE FAIRCHILD: So he's had them bang, bang, bang, bang.

MR. BARRASSE: Correct. You'll find most of these that are in the last year-and-a-half period have been in that short time period. We're not talking about, in these cases where you see two and three DUIs, that they were two years ago or three years ago. This is our files of the last year-and-a-half or year and eight months.

REPRESENTATIVE FAIRCHILD: We are trying to do it, of course, through the Department of Transportation, but would it make any sense to give the court the same responsibility in a case like Mr. Woodbridge to say, "Wait a minute. You've had four DUIs in the last year," -- for example; I'm not sure of the time frame -- "your license is hereby suspended immediately"?

MR. BARRASSE: I think that that ability to do that is correct. However, I think the uniformity then would be lost, and I think the fact that you have whether it be a difference between Lackawanna County and Wayne and Philadelphia might come out, number one.

Second of all, there are differences in judges. We have some judges that give 30 days. We have some that give six months. I don't think that that is an adequate way of handling the problem.

REPRESENTATIVE FAIRCHILD: Thank you.

CHAIRMAN LLOYD: Other members?

Representative Tigue.

REPRESENTATIVE TIGUE: I'm sorry I missed your testimony, but looking through here, you put in here that between 1989 and 1992 in Lackawanna County there is triple the amount of arrests.

MR. BARRASSE: Correct.

REPRESENTATIVE TIGUE: That indicates to me, in

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 fact, the opposite of what you're saying; that the laws that we passed in the early '80s are not prohibiting people from driving. If we have increased the number of arrests threefold in three years, and we take away their licenses and you have repeat offenders, why, then, would 1942 solve the problem?

MR. BARRASSE: I think that the short range view would be that it is not working. I think that when you look at it, though, prior the arrests were not being made. Many police officers were not strictly enforcing the DUI, and there are still some officers out there who are not strongly enforcing it.

I think in the last five years you have seen a strength in enforcement. I think the awareness program, I think MADD, I think the Department of Transportation, I think a number of factors have variabled into this. I think it is now, because of that increased enforcement, that we are seeing the numbers that we have. I think until something is effectively done to deal with the problem -- and that's what I've stated -- until those persons that have been arrested, their license suspended and some type of clinical evaluation be completed on them, we are not going to have any success, so, therefore, the second and third time offender, that they don't get their license back, as has been declared in Act 122, but, more

importantly, let's do it now on the first arrest so that we don't have these several hundred subsequent offenses.

REPRESENTATIVE TIGUE: But your numbers don't indicate that that is going to cut down the offenses. It seems that you're telling me people who've already had their licenses suspended, they're the ones you're picking up because of repeat offenses.

MR. BARRASSE: No. Their license is not suspended is my point to you.

REPRESENTATIVE TIGUE: No; that their license was suspended.

MR. BARRASSE: Well, several of them are not. As I'm saying to you, these are not through the criminal justice system yet; they have not been convicted. If you look at the bulk of them, the DUI homicide, Mr. Reaser has been driving for two-and-a-half years for someone that he killed in 1991 -- two years since the one that he killed in 1990, I believe it is, and he has not had a suspension on his license because of the fact that he has not been sentenced; so, therefore, the DL-21 has not been sent in because technically he's not convicted until time of sentencing. Therefore, he's been driving this entire time.

Mr. Gomba is also awaiting trial on a DUI homicide, and, again, he has not gone through and there has not been a conviction in the matter, so, therefore, he has not been

suspended.

REPRESENTATIVE TIGUE: But couldn't, under 1942, if I appeal suspension, I could drag this on the same way because the courts are backlogged? How is that problem going to be solved?

MR. BARRASSE: The way I read it, there is not a correlation between the criminal case and the administrative proceeding taking the license. So, therefore, even if somebody was found not guilty of a DUI, homicide DUI, or DUI charge, it would not have an impact upon the suspension of his license. I think that that is important here when we go back to the original question of the difference between preponderance of the evidence or beyond a reasonable doubt. We are held to a much higher standard, as we should be, in criminal court. For a license, I believe it should be a difference.

The bill clearly, in its present form, states that there is a difference between the two, and there will be no effect on the administrative proceeding by the criminal case.

REPRESENTATIVE TIGUE: Thank you.

CHAIRMAN LLOYD: Any other questions?

(No response.)

CHAIRMAN LLOYD: If not, thank you very much.

MR. BARRASSE: Thank you.

 CHAIRMAN LLOYD: The next witness is John Mancke.

MR. MANCKE: By way of introduction, my name is John Mancke, a partner in the law firm of Mancke and Wagner in Harrisburg. While my practice includes defending those charged with driving under the influence, I have lectured and participated in panel discussions on the subject of Traffic Law and Driving Under the Influence for such diverse groups as The Fraternal Order of Police, The Pennsylvania Bar Institute, The Pennsylvania Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, The American Bar Institute, The National Highway Traffic and Safety Administration, The Dickinson School of Law, and currently serve as an Adjunct Professor at Widener School of Law.

I am personally concerned about the concept of taking a person's driving privileges regardless of whether the motorist is guilty of a crime and before the person has an opportunity to defend himself from criminal charges.

The proposed preadjudication suspension included in House Bill 1942 destroys the basic concepts of fundamental fairness and due process. It permits, without meaningful review, the "grabbing" of a motorist's license by an officer without even a hint of any constitutional guarantees.

It permits an officer to take a driver's license even though the officer's arrest was illegal or the test

result was improperly or illegally obtained.

The Amendment A2187 provides for the police officer to act for the Department when he takes the license. Then if the action of the officer is reviewed, another agent from the same Department reviews the officer's actions. If the motorist asks for a hearing, the hearing is held by a hearing officer designated by the Department's secretary.

This review process is as ridiculous as allowing Al Davis of the Oakland Raiders to pick his own referees, his own replay officials, and then have the final appeal heard by himself or his designee.

As written, House Bill 1942 and Amendment A2187 presupposes the accuracy, correctness, and validity of blood alcohol tests. My experience, and the experience of the courts of this state, clearly indicates that police officers performing those tests often violate state mandated regulations on the use of chemical testing devices. These violations are not isolated incidents but are indicative of a lack of understanding of the Departments of Health and Transportation guidelines.

The concept of preadjudication suspension says "we don't care" if those regulations which were adopted to insure fundamental fairness are complied with by the arresting officer.

I want to give you some specific examples of the

potential abuses facing every motorist that travels on the highway. In the exhibits that I have provided, you will see log books from the West Shore Booking Center in Cumberland County, which reveal a failure to recognize that test results were obtained in direct violation of state law. A total of 39 consecutive tests were improperly obtained and became part of criminal prosecutions.

House Bill 1942 says "so what" and takes the person's driving privileges away from him without regard to the fact that a judge, in a criminal trial, would later declare a test illegal.

To further illustrate the problem, I've also included an example of an illegal test in Dauphin County and one from the State Police to show it is a problem with those departments as well.

I am not the only one concerned about the validity of blood alcohol test results that are improperly obtained. This year the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reversed a DUI conviction because the State Police had been receiving shipments of simulator solutions used in breath testing that were so deficient that evidence led investigators to conclude the testing process was "unreliable." (See Commonwealth v. Brosnick, 607 A.2d 725 (Pa. 1992)). Previously, the same court had to reverse a conviction when it determined police were using an improper and unapproved

breath testing device. (See <u>Commonwealth v. McGinnis</u>, 515 A.2d 847 (1986)).

Abuses have also been found by the Superior Court which has discovered breath testing devices in use in the western and eastern parts of this Commonwealth in total disregard to compliance with state law. (See Commonwealth v. Thill, 1964 Pitts, 1990, opinion dated August 6, 1992, and Commonwealth v. Mabrey, 594 A.2d 700 (Pa. Super. 1991)).

These constitute only a few of the many abuses and illegalities that have occurred in obtaining test results. They are not limited to one defendant, one county, or one part of the Commonwealth.

The pathetic irony of this Bill and Amendment A2187 is that the Department has trained the officers who are performing the illegal and improper tests. Now we have a bill that will permit these officers to continue the illegal testing without regard to the ultimate outcome of the criminal proceedings. Worse yet, the motorist will have his privileges suspended.

In 1989, I suggested that the Department of
Transportation impose a regulation that would permit access
to the log book records of breath testing devices to insure
compliance with their own regulations. The Department of
Transportation refused, but the Independent Regulatory

Review Commission strongly recommended the adoption of such a regulation in 1990 (see order attached). To date, the Department of Transportation has done nothing.

A very disappointing feature of this Bill is the total lack of consideration of rehabilitation for those motorists in need of help and assistance. Many counties have been using Interlock systems to prevent repeat offenders as part of their ARD programs. This program has been overwhelmingly successful on a national basis and in the counties where it is being used. This Bill will severely restrict its use in Pennsylvania.

The increase of the minimum loss of license in ARD cases to 90 days imposes a radical departure from current law. The Bill will make loss of jobs common occurrences for those accused of DUI regardless of whether they are guilty of the crime.

Any effort to add a refusal to take a chemical test as a reason for a preadjudication suspension will only magnify the lack of concern for any sense of fairness. I noted this past week that one of the County DUI coordinators proposed that police officers be given a 15-hour course and then be permitted to take blood from motorists traveling on our highways. You heard me correctly, the officer would be permitted to "grab and stab." These are not doctors and nurses, these are cops

playing "doctor" and "nurse."

Under the amendment, if a motorist were to refuse, he or she would lose his driving privileges even if he or she agreed to take a test at a hospital where a real doctor or nurse would be available.

While time does not permit me to point out the technical deficiencies of this Bill, I again state my very real concern for the concept of preadjudication suspensions which permit the taking of driving privileges without regard to fundamental fairness and due process.

Thank you for this opportunity to express my views on this very important matter.

(Whereupon, the attachments to Mr. Mancke's written testimony follow:)

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BREATH TEST LOG: Intoxilyzer 5000 Serial # 64-001274

CASE	DATE	SUBJECT'S NAME			VIDEO OPER.	ARREST- ING OFFICER	PD	CERTIF- IED OPERATOR	PD	DAG	BAC	CAL.
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	4 9.7280	,			WASS		WF	REUM	CORP	124	126	.096 3
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BREATH TEST LOG: Intoxilyzer 5000 Serial # 64-001274

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1-90-254	9/26/90				W455	bound	WE	AKE	cci	137	-138	.097]
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& no refusal, MS Andrew took for blood. Device is not out of service 1-1/1/10 fre

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INDEPENDENT REGULATORY REVIEW COMMISSION 14th Floor, 333 Market Street Harrisburg, PA 17101

Commissioners Present:

Public Meeting Held December 6, 1989

Irvin G. Zimmerman, Acting Chairman Robert J. Harbison, III Mark D. Schwartz Thomas P. Comerford, Jr.

Department of Transportation
and Department of Health
Equipment and Training Required for Administering
Chemical Tests; Test Procedures and Accuracy
Certification for Breath Test Devices

Docket No. #18-277

BY ORDER OF THE COMMISSION

On November 8, 1989, the Independent Regulatory Review Commission (Commission) received this proposed regulation from the Departments of Transportation (PennDOT) and Health (Health). This proposal readopts the regulations which delineate the equipment and training required for the administration of chemical breath tests and the accuracy certification for breath test devices as contained in Title 67, Chapter 77, Subchapter B. This regulation was initially adopted under the authority of Sections 1547(c)(1) and 6103 of the Vehicle Code Act of June 17, 1976, P.L. 162, No. 81 (75 Pa. C.S. §§ 1547(c)(1) and 6103). These regulations will become effective upon publication in the Pennsylvania Bulletin, without notice of proposed rulemaking.

PennDCT and Health propose to readopt Chapter 77, Subchapter B as it currently exists prior to the December 22, 1989, sunset date. Readoption of this Chapter is necessary for the continuation of standards governing the training required for those individuals administering breath tests to determine the concentration of ethyl alconol in a person's blood, the procedure for administering such tests and for certifying the accuracy of devices used to perform such tests. We note that Subchapter A of Chapter 77, entitled "Interim Regulations" will be allowed to expire (Pa.B. 2760 (July 1, 1989)). These regulations were enacted as emergency interim procedures for breath tests and accuracy verification required for the implementation of Act 289 of 1982 (P.L. 1268, No. 289).

A public notice of Transportation's and Health's intention to readopt these regulations was published in the July 1, 1989, Pennsylvania Bulletin (Pa.B. 2774). In response to this notice, comments were received from John B. Mancke, a Harrisburg accorney.

Principle recommended from in cases where a test reveals that a person's blood alcohol level is below 0.15%, the officer administering the test should be required to advise motorists of their right to have a second series of tests within one-half hour after the original test was performed and that this test be performed by the officer instead of requiring the person to seek private testing as required by 75 C.S. § 1547(h). Mr. Mancke suggested that this second series of tests will give some indication of whether a person's blood alcohol level is rising (or falling) and will provide a more accurate estimate of the person's blood alcohol level at the time the driving occurred.

Since PennDOI's regulations only define the appropriate procedure for performing a breath test and do not delineate when tests should be administered, and since the statute (75 Pa. C.S. § 1547) clearly delineates when tests are to be performed and provides for subsequent tests, we feel that any changes pertaining to additional tests should be implemented through a legislative amendment to the statute, not by a change in the regulations.

Mr. Mancke has also recommended that the regulations be amended to provide that all log books that contain, the test records for all breath equipment be made available "for public inspection during the normal course of business operations [at] the station in which the test is being performed." He further suggested that log books contain all breath tests and the results and the reasons for the equipment being taken out of service.

The current regulations only require that a "certificate of accuracy" be completed when accuracy inspection and calibration inspections are successfully completed. Accuracy inspections are required within thirty days of when equipment is used and whenever malfunctioning equipment is returned to service. Calibration tests are required to be performed annually. The regulations make no provision for recording breath test results or the results of the simulator test performed after each "breath test" (i.e. the two consecutive tests). Similarly, there are no requirements as to how these certificates are maintained or made available to persons who have been tested or to their attorneys.

As part of our follow-up investigation, Mr. Mancke explained that the availability of the records for the test equipment varies considerably depending on the position of the local district attorney. Usually, these records are not available until the parties enter into formal discovery. Consequently, persons charged with driving under the influence of alcohol may have to incur unnecessary legal expenses to determine if the breath test equipment was operating properly or if they had been tested properly. Moreover, some cases would not have to proceed beyond the preliminary hearing stage if the information concerning the accuracy of the breath test equipment or testing procedures anade it clear that they did not comply with PennDOT regulations.

Therefore, we feel that in the interest of potentially reducing some of the legal costs incurred by affected persons and by our judicial system, these regulations should be amended to: require that a log book be maintained for each testing device; that the results of all accuracy inspection tests, simulator tests and breath tests be maintained in the log book; and that a copy of the log book be available to persons who have been tested, or their attorneys, during normal business hours. PennDOT should also address the necessity of developing procedures to preserve the confidentiality of individual breath test results.

PennDOT responded to Mr. Mancke's July 11, 1989, comments by letter dated August 30, 1989, which states, inter alia, that it was not their intention to make any substantive changes to the regulations in question. PennDOT further stated that Mr. Mancke's comments would be maintained on file and given consideration in the future should the Departments decide to pursue substantive changes to these regulations. We find that PennDOT's response to Mr. Mancke's comments to be contradictory to the fundamental purpose of the sunset process and to its invitation "to submit written comments, suggestions or objections to the Departments' intentions to readopt these regulations in their present form." (Pa.B. 2775). Since the Departments only received one set of comments on their proposed readoption of these regulations, we are disappointed that PennDOT did not make a more concerted effort to address these comments. We feel that a few minor changes to these regulations are warranted to make these regulations less procedurally burdensome and we urge PennDOT to promptly initiate these changes.

Since it is clearly in the public interest that these regulations remain in effect beyond the sunset deadline of December 22, 1989, and since PennDOT would require some time to conduct the research necessary to formulate a proposed rulemaking to amend these regulations, we feel that these regulations should be readopted in their existing form. However, we strongly recommend that PennDOT initiate a proposed rulemaking to implement the amendments to Chapter 67 discussed above.

THEREFORE IT IS ORDERED THAT:

- 1) IRRC Regulation #18-277, "Equipment and Training Required for Administering Chemical Tests; Test Procedures and Accuracy Certification for Breath Test Devices", submitted by the Departments of Health and Transportation, be approved as submitted to the Commission on November 8, 1989; and
- 2) A copy of this Order be transmitted to the Legislative Reference Bureau.

CHAIRMAN LLOYD: Why do you assume that just because there is an administrative hearing, that there is no concept of due process applicable; that, therefore, if you want to challenge the way in which the test was conducted, or if you want to challenge the solution that was used, or you want to challenge the credibility of the witness, that those are somehow options denied you?

MR. MANCKE: First of all, the amendments completely scare me because they suggest that the same people who have been doing, as I understand it, have been doing the reviews of speeding point cases will be the people who are going to hear these hearings.

Cumberland County, two judges have said those hearings are absolute violation of any sense of fairness; and, in fact, the other day, the last one I was in, I walked in and the person came over to me and said, "Why are you here, you know what I'm going to give him," even before we presented one iota of testimony. So past practice scares me in that regard.

CHAIRMAN LLOYD: I have had some experience in administrative agency law, and it seems to me if someone makes that kind of a statement, you've got a pretty compelling case on appeal. Have you attempted to appeal any of those to Commonwealth Court?

MR. MANCKE: We've appealed them to county courts as

they go under the present system in speeding cases, and they have been reversed, and then they are sent back down to the same hearing examiner who had held the first hearing. I am concerned about that.

CHAIRMAN LLOYD: I understand that. I just want to make clear -- most of the members of the Committee are not attorneys, and I don't want people to be left with the notion that if you establish an administrative process, that that means that there is no way to hold the hearing officer accountable for basic due process rights. I mean you may or may not be satisfied that that is being done, but the amendment indicates that appeals -- number one, you have to follow the Administrative Code in the Pennsylvania Consolidated Statutes, and, number two, that you have the right of appeal to Commonwealth Court.

So the issue of whether they were taking the test when it was an illegal stop and the issue of whether or not the person who gave the test followed the proper procedures are all issues which you would have an opportunity to litigate.

MR. MANCKE: Eventually, correct. And as far as the Bill is concerned, I will have lost my license perhaps up to 20 days during that process. That concerns me.

As far as the Amendment is concerned, I believe it was the Department of Transportation proposed, they take

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 away the Administrative Code review requirements, and I'm concerned about that.

I'm also concerned when it comes to the due process part, how is the evidence going to be presented? In one of the proposals by the Department it suggests I have to have the officer there. Why would I want to bring in somebody that I don't believe would be truthful, if, in fact, that's the case? Why would I want to bring that person in to testify on my behalf? I don't think it makes sense.

CHAIRMAN LLOYD: Other questions?

Representative Snyder.

REPRESENTATIVE SNYDER: Turning to your exhibits, I'm looking at one here that is highlighted in yellow and pink.

MR. MANCKE: Yes.

REPRESENTATIVE SNYDER: Explain to me what the highlights mean and what this exhibit is showing us?

MR. MANCKE: You will notice on 9/13/90 there was a test done which had a blood alcohol level of a .287 and a .260. The Department regulations require that unit to be taken immediately out of service, to be recalibrated and recertified.

REPRESENTATIVE SNYDER: Because it's so high it must be wrong?

MR. MANCKE: Because a deviation of .020 requires

that under the regulations.

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Then you will notice that every officer that ran a test afterwards never went back to check whether the test before it was legal. That makes every one of those following tests illegal.

All of these prosecutions had to be discharged all the way over until you got to 10/04/90, in which those officers realized something is wrong with that unit because they got and 242 and a .215, which, again, showed a deviation of .020. So all of those prosecutions went by the wayside because people didn't even understand what they were doing.

REPRESENTATIVE SNYDER: Let's go on now I guess to the second exhibit. What is that showing?

MR. MANCKE: That's the State Police exhibit.

You'll notice that the calibration is a .11, the C.11.

That means that when they put a simulator solution in that unit, it read a .11. That is improper and in violation of the regulations, which indicate that if it reads a .11, the unit has to be taken out of service.

Ironically, this State Trooper, as the maintenance person with the Intoxilyzer, has more than the additional expertise available to someone who is just a breath test operator.

On the next test, again, you'll see a deviation of

the .020 or greater apart, where you have a .158 and a .123. Again, this one resulted in several others afterwards being improper as well when it was not discovered.

REPRESENTATIVE SNYDER: If I get the import of your testimony properly, I think your argument is that because of the vagaries of the testing process, that there is a very distinct possibility that people whose actual blood alcohol level is much lower than the .10 are going to be losing their license without any due process.

Is that a fair statement?

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MR. MANCKE: I'm very concerned that what you're doing is making, number one, a civil burden of proof.

Number two, I think you take away much of the evidentiary problems by simply saying they don't count. And number three, in answer to your direct question, I feel that due process is necessary; I think a person's driver's license is important in this day and age. I do note that the Supreme Court of this state has now suggested that a person's medical license is important enough that it should have all the due process requirements adhered to.

REPRESENTATIVE SNYDER: Let me pose this question then. If your concerns regarding the accuracy of the testing process and procedures were allayed, in a perfect world, would you still have a problem with this Bill? In

other words, if you were assured that every blood alcohol test that was given was accurate, would you, nonetheless, still have a problem with this concept of administrative suspension?

MR. MANCKE: Only from this standpoint, and this, perhaps, goes on the other side. And I know there's a Bill pending before the Legislature to change the time requirements, in other words, a test result of .10 within three hours.

I think when you look at this objectively you have to make it consistent with the DUI law. So if that's going to be amended to make .10 within three hours of -- I think it should be the arrest rather than they have now of driving, because I think that allows someone to be convicted even though they never drank and drove. I think that has to be corrected. But if you're going to put a time frame on it on the criminal side, you should have it on this side as well, because you do leave open all the issues of extrapolation, which are currently causing the criminal side a lot of problems at the present time.

REPRESENTATIVE SNYDER: Let me approach this another way. You mentioned the Interlock system that's in use in other counties.

MR. MANCKE: Yes.

REPRESENTATIVE SNYDER: That's a system whereby an

apparatus is put on the vehicle. If I've been drinking, I get in my vehicle, and that apparatus is there, I can't drive the vehicle.

Do you think that's a good system?

MR. MANCKE: Yes.

REPRESENTATIVE SNYDER: Let me ask you this then: instead of having the administrative suspension upon a blood alcohol of .10, why don't we just require that those individuals have that Interlock system put on their cars so that there's no question then? I mean they'll still be able to drive if they've not been drinking, but they won't be if they have been.

Would that be acceptable to you?

MR. MANCKE: Would that be acceptable to me? Yes, it would.

REPRESENTATIVE SNYDER: The point I'm trying to make here is your concern is regarding the accuracy of the testing procedures --

MR. MANCKE: That's correct.

REPRESENTATIVE SNYDER: -- more than the philosophical problems that you perhaps have with due process.

MR. MANCKE: I am concerned that ultimately the criminal side would adjudicate whether that suspension were proper or not. But to allay the fears that these people

are going to get out and are going to be driving and driving and driving, to allay those fears, I don't have a problem with the Guardian Interlock device. I think it's a good program. I think it has to be funded, however, so that all people would have equal access to it.

REPRESENTATIVE SNYDER: And you think doing that administratively, as is being proposed with the blood alcohol administrative suspension in this Bill, you have no problem with that as far as any due process?

MR. MANCKE: I would not, as a compromise to facing the problem -- and I'm on record as far as the Guardian Interlock device. I wrote I think the first article in Pennsylvania in The Pennsylvania Law Journal about the program. I think if you are concerned about helping those people who show a high blood alcohol level, I think it can be addressed through that type of mechanism as opposed to simply saying, "You have no recourse; we have your license. Oh, yes, you have this right to appeal, but it's through the Department and you have a very limited right to appeal."

REPRESENTATIVE SNYDER: So you have no problem with that even prior to conviction?

MR. MANCKE: I don't have a problem with that prior to conviction: that's correct.

REPRESENTATIVE SNYDER: Thank you.

CHAIRMAN LLOYD: Representative Lescovitz.

REPRESENTATIVE LESCOVITZ: Just one question dealing with the first-time arrest. Is there any medium where, possibly -- we had someone testify earlier where someone has gone two-and-a-half years through an appeal process. Would this possibly be a situation where we could say the second or the third time, that we could possibly suspend this individual's driver's license if they were caught two or three times in a row?

I mean I understand the due -- what I'm worried about is you have someone who is under appeal for six months or a year, they get caught second, third, fourth time in that period, and there's no way in the world right now we can take that person's license away administratively.

Is there a point in between there where we could -MR. MANCKE: Again, I don't call them second, third
offender. They've been charged, but they haven't been
convicted. So in answer, again, to be consistent, I would
think the Interlock device should be available to those
people.

As far as these extreme examples, I sit here and I listen to a district attorney tell me it's two-and-a-half years until he gets a conviction in a matter heard by the court. I don't understand that. Why did it take them so

long? They have a 365-day rule that says you have to be tried within 365 days. Why wasn't he tried, and why wasn't the -- remember, when you talk about appeals -- and the Superior Court has just ruled this way; that at the time the local court makes its determination on post-trial motions, that license is taken and there is no right to hold onto that license. I don't know whether that's fair or not, but they just ruled that to be the case. So I don't think extreme examples of two-and-a-half years -- my response is: why did it take them so long?

REPRESENTATIVE LESCOVITZ: I'm not saying that this is an extreme example. There may be cases where there may be a second time in the second month, a third time in the third month. That does happen.

I'm saying you would not be in favor of any of those -- you want the due process to move along.

MR. MANCKE: Yes.

REPRESENTATIVE LESCOVITZ: If it happens two or three times in a month, or two months, or a year --

MR. MANCKE: Right, because you would have taken

39 -- on this one in Cumberland County, which prides itself
in its accuracy of everything dealing with DUI, you would
have had 39 people's licenses, 39 of them.

Remember, I asked the Department of Transportation in 1989 to make those log books available. They didn't

want to do it. The Independent Regulatory Commission said

it's a great idea; then we know whether this problem exists

right away. But they did nothing with it.

CHAIRMAN LLOYD: I have a question. Why, in that Cumberland County example, if there were an administrative process, why would you not be able to challenge the taking of a license in that administrative proceeding on the same basis of the flaw in the testing that you would be able to challenge in a criminal case?

MR. MANCKE: I'm worried that they're going to come down -- and I saw Connecticut came down with an opinion that suggested, in these preadjudication suspension proceedings, that because there is a difference between a civil penalty and a criminal penalty, that many of the issues concerning breath testing devices aren't relevant. I'm concerned that that would happen in this case. That's what I'm concerned about.

There is no reference -- if you notice, there is absolutely no reference to compliance with the regulations of the Department of Transportation and the Department of Health in this Bill. That certainly, I think, is essential.

CHAIRMAN LLOYD: Any other questions?

(No response.)

CHAIRMAN LLOYD: If not, thank you very much.

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MR. MANCKE: Thank you.

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CHAIRMAN LLOYD: The next witness is Leo Doyle from the National Association of Independent Insurers.

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Mr. Doyle.

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MR. DOYLE: Good morning.

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is Leo W. Doyle, and I represent the National Association of Independent Insurers, a property casualty trade

Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee, my name

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association comprised of over 560 insurance companies, 79

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of which are licensed to write automobile coverage in the

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Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.

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I am accompanied today by our local counsel,

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Mr. Ralph Tive, and his associate, Pam Witmer.

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Our support of House Bill 1942 should come as no surprise, considering the consumer dissatisfaction over the

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cost of auto insurance and our own publicly-pronounced

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commitment to cost containment.

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In this regard, our less than subtle exposure to losses resulting from alcohol-related vehicular accidents,

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while obvious, should require some embellishment.

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During my own personal involvement in the settlement of insurance claims, I have represented the victims of auto

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accidents, and I have defended negligent operators. I also

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have represented a beleaguered industry seeking measures by

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which we can fairly and reasonably respond to our

contractual obligations while reducing the attendant cost of that process to our equally beleaguered policyholders.

Our attempts to moderate claims exposure has been significantly thwarted in part by the thoughtless and reckless drivers operating under the influence of drugs and alcohol.

But cost alone is not the overriding objective to us, nor should it be to this deliberative body. For over four decades the deaths and injuries to which our family, friends, and consumers have been subjected has been a national tragedy.

I submit we have little right to accept this as a normal sequence to high speed highways and high powered machinery. We have even less right to accept it because of thoughtlessness and irresponsibility of motor vehicle operators.

With it all, the righteousness of the purposes and intent of House Bill 1942 seems unequivocally clear. In this spirit we will limit our brief comments to what we perceive to be the legislative justification for its enactment.

First, let us emphatically state that we have confidence that, if enacted, this proposal will have a dramatic, measurable impact on the number and effect of alcohol-related motor vehicle accidents. According to

research conducted by the Insurance Institute of Highway
Safety over two years ago, in those states in which
administrative license revocation laws have been enacted,
there was a nine percent reduction in fatal crashes during
the late night and early morning hours when alcohol
involvement in such crashes is especially high.

More close to home, in the neighboring state of Maryland, where the ALR law has been in effect for the last two years, over 37,000 operators have had their licenses suspended under the provisions of that law. This has prompted a spokesman from the Governor's Office to state, "It is saving lives. It is changing people's behavior on the road." This seems to follow a national trend.

Of more interest to this body would be a fact sheet distributed by the National Highway Safety Administration, a copy of which has been provided to this Committee.

According to their projections, an ALR law in Pennsylvania could result in a yearly savings of between 44 and 66 citizens' lives.

The Administration has estimated a direct cost savings from various sources to range from \$5 million to \$7.8 million, and a societal cost in excess of \$29 million. Additionally, enactment of this law also could make the state eligible for federal incentive grant funds.

Although these are estimates and could be challenged

on the basis of speculation, their authoritative source gives us confidence in mentioning them as a response to one of the traditional objections which seems to be raised against ALR proposals by legislators — that being the administrative cost which will be confronted by enforcement officials, judicial processing and Department of Transportation implementation.

Prior to our published support for House Bill 1942, our local representatives have met with local officials on these concerns, and we are hopeful that dialogue has resulted in accommodating amendments which will be offered, both to allay those fears and produce an even more smoothly structured law. Certainly, we are hopeful that those changes, along with the National Highway Safety

Administration projections, will provide sufficient offset so that the humanitarian purposes of the measure will carry it to an early enactment.

One other obstacle that is often raised questions whether the administrative revocation, separate from a judicial hearing, creates a constitutionally recognized deprivation of due process. We can assure you that the issue has been tested in the courts with the conclusion that there is an important interest served transcending any property interest relating to the possession of a driver's license.

Several states, including Idaho as early as 1985, have embraced the doctrine articulated by the U.S. Supreme Court in Mackey v. Montrym (443 US1-1979) and subsequent cases to hold that administrative license revocation is a rational exercise of the state in furtherance of a sound legislative purpose. We are aware of no case in which a contrary position has been taken. All the decisions, in fact, hold there are ample due process protections in the respective laws to sustain their validity.

Summing it up, we believe the enactment of House Bill 1942 produces many pluses, with no negatives. Economically, the law makes good sense, but the protection of citizens' lives and limbs is a far greater incentive. It would be difficult to argue against a measure that could spare one person injury or death, one family the attendant heartache of the loss of a loved one, or even the ultimate guilt of one irresponsible drinker, if the threat of license revocation could keep him away from the wheel of his car.

Naturally, good highway safety laws and practices directly benefit the automobile insurance industry. Claims are reduced and the premium cost to our consumers are moderated. But my association would be here to urge enactment of House Bill 1942 if not a penny could be saved. Too many of us as claims adjusters, actuaries, and simply

private citizens have observed what highway carnage does to our friends and ourselves. Every process which we can devise to reverse the accident trends should be developed and employed. On this principle alone we urge passage of House Bill 1942.

We express our appreciation for the opportunity to comment on this very important subject and extend to you and your associates the offer of our assistance in your future deliberations.

(Whereupon, the attachments to Mr. Doyle's written testimony follow:)





Administrative License Revocation Fact Sheet

In 1990 there were an estimated 735 alcohol-involved fatalities in Pennsylvania, according to Fatal Accident Reporting System data.

A Pennsylvania Administrative License Revocation (ALR) Law would produce the following benefits each year, based on estimates from current research.

Yearly Savings

44 to 66	Lives	
\$ 5.2 to 7.8 Million	Direct Costs (medical, rehabilitation, etc.)	
\$29.9 to 44.9 Million	Societal Costs (lost productivity plus direct costs)	

A Pennsylvania ALR law could make the State eligible for Federal incentive grant funds.

\$2.34 Million annual Section 408 Grant, if Pennsylvania meets the besic and all supplemental grant criteria. The funds are available annually for five years.

In addition, a Pennsylvania ALR law would help Pennsylvania qualify for Section 410 grant funds. The 1991 Highway Bill authorized \$25 million annually for all States from 1993 through 1997 for the Section 410 program.

For more information on Administrative License Revocation, contact:

Frank Altobelli, Regional Administrator National Highway Traffic Safety Administration Phone: 301-768-7111 Fax: 301-768-7118

- The fatality reduction estimates are based upon a National Highway Traffic Safety Administration-sponsored study of Administrative License Revocation (ALR) law effects on single vehicle nighttime fatal crashes (6% reduction) and an Insurance Institute for Highway Safety study of ALR effects on fatal crashes during periods of high alcohol involvement (9% reduction). If you assume that ALR has a similar effect on all alcohol-involved crashes, the yearly savings estimates in the Fact Sheet are obtained by applying these percentage reductions to the 1990 Fatal Accident Reporting System (FARS) estimates of alcohol-related fatalities in Pennsylvania.
- Cost estimates are based on figures developed for a 1991 Federal Highway Administration study, "The Costs of Highway Crashes."
- The direct cost estimate is composed of medical, property damage, legal and court, emergency services, insurance administration, workplace, and travel delay costs.
 Direct costs were \$118,400 per fatality in 1990 dollars. Lost productivity was estimated at \$561,800 per fatality in 1990. The total societal cost per fatality in 1990, both direct costs and lost productivity, was \$680,200.
- Although ALR reduces alcohol-involved injury and property damage crashes as well as fatalities, there are no studies that provide conclusive data on these reductions. Consequently, the savings estimates do not include any impact on property damage and injury crashes.

DL-21 (3-92)

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ATTACHMENT A

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RESPONSE FROM PENNSYLVANIA BUREAU OF MOTOR VEHICLES

QLN: 21610139. VALIDATED: 060192. EXPIRES: 0696.

NAM: REASER, TODD

DOB: 061867. SEX: M.

116 SPRING GARDEN ST

MOSCOW

PA. 18444

RESTRICTIONS: SUSPENSION: NO OPERATOR CLASS: C = SINGLE VEH <= 26,000 IPERATUR TYPE: REGULAR OPERATOR NUMBER OF DUPLICATES: 00

INFORMATION OBTAINED FROM PENNDOT FILES AND SHOULD BE VERIFIED

ATTACHMENT B

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OLN: 18472792. VALIDATED: 062189. EXPIRES: 0893.

NAM: GOMBA, JOHN JAMES DÖB: 080943. SEX: M.

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OPERATOR CLASS: C = SINGLE VEH <= 26,000

DEERATOR TYPE: REGULAR OPERATOR

NUMBER OF DUPLICATES: 00

INFORMATION OBTAINED FROM PENNDOT FILES AND SHOULD BE VERIFIED

ATTACEMENT C

REPEAT DUI OFFENDERS

DEFENDANTS	# OFFENSE	BLOOD ALCOHOL
Robert Woodbridge	4 DUI	Refusal
Kenneth Pugh	2 DUI	.157
Costic Laniewski	2 DUI	Refusal
Thomas Perfilio	2 DUI	Refusal
Joel Gurley	2 DUI	Refusal
Paul Kinney	2 DUI	.18 & .15
John Crawford	3 DUI	.16 & .20
Bernard Kasulis	2 DUI	.291
Peter Terzoni	2 DUI	Refusal
arle Mc Dermott	2 DUI	.222
Jeffrey Manning	2 DUI	.198 & .163
Daniel O'Brien	2 DUI	.156
Gary Kane	2 DUI	Refusal & .21
Gary Lee	2 DUI	Refusals
Deborah Rabiega	3 DUI	.249 & .27
David Mraz	2 DUI	Refusal
Mark Sargent	2 DUI	Refusal
Marle Sermiale	2 DUI	.27
John Leonard	2 DUI	Refusal
Brian Durkin	2 DUI	.172
Fred Cramer	2 DUI	.223
~avid Godlewski	2 DUI	.328

Migrel Ortega	2 DUI	.126 & Refusal
John Harrity	3 DUI	Refusals
Nicholas Nottola	2 DUI	.20 € .134
Thomas J. Davis	3 DUI	.219 & .195 & .175
George Troutman	2 DUI	Refusal
Thomas Murphy	3 DUI	.166 & .27 & .201
Jeff Bielinski	2 DUI	.123
Patrick O'Brien	2 DUI	Refusal
Victor Olmedo	3 DUI	Refusals
Timothy Sheridan	2 DUI	Refus a l
James Kell	2 DUI	.186 & Refusal
Richael Hermanovich	2 DUI	.180 & .126
chael Pronkco	2 DUI	.307
Raymond Ayalo	2 DUI	Refusal
Michael Hansell	2 DUI	.185 & Refusal
George DeHaven	2 DUI	.356
Witkor Minajew	2 DUI	.249
Jerry Goyne	3 DUI	.149 & .16 & .133
Cheryl Mynyle	2 DUI	.179
David Krokc	2 DUI	.156
John Fitch	2 DUI	.216
Neil Sofrandco	2 DUI	.278
Frank Bomba	2 DUI	Refusal
George Daleunchak	2 DUI	.190 & Refusal
Kevin Donovan	2 DUI	.16
chard Fanucci	2 DUI	.16

James Buck	2 DUI	REFUSAL
David Wilga	2 DUI	.20 & .183
Jeff Marcks	2 DUI	REFUSAL
Bruce Orloski	2 DUI	.161
Joseph Calabro	2 DUI	.133
John Memo	2 DUI	.286
Chris Stachnik	2 DUI	REFUSAL
Joseph Giannetti	2 DUI	.124 & .131
Thomas Luby	2 DUI	.107 € .20
Roy Ridgeway	2 DUI	.17 & .14
Joesph Wagner	2 DUI	.227 € .279
Leo Hughes	2 DUI	.307
ry Black	2 DUI	.203
Joseph Shorter	2 DUI	.363
Lisa Rubin	2 DUI	.20
Mary Griffin	2 DUI	.219 & .28
Michael Lynch	2 DUI	REFUSAL
David Shafer	2 DU1	.17
James Kapp	3 DUI	.188
Joanne Brajukea	2 DUI	REFUSAL
Esther Shafer	2 DUI	.191
Paul Sluck	2 DUI	.207
David Chichura	2 DUI	.209 & .263
James Kresly	2 DUI	REFUSAL
Armand Galea	2 DUI	.155 & .22
ephen Seamon	2 DUI	REFUSAL

Vernon Decker	2 DUI	.154
Joseph Zrowlea	2 DUI	.251 & .21
John White	2 DUI	REFUSAL
Joseph Acosta	2 DUI	.30
Thomas Adamski	2 DUI	.222 & .226
Bernard Anderjack	2 DUI	REFUSAL
Candy Anderson	2 DUI	.23
Nick Anzelmi	2 DUI	.13
Ellis Heckler	2 DUI	REFUSAL
Gerard Moran	2 DUI	.19 & .331
Fred Dombkowski	3 DUI	.109 & .18
William Black	2 DUI	.164
trick O'Brein	2 DUI	REFUSAL
Carole Bentler	2 DUI	.171
Steven Anderson	2 DUI	.21
James Becker	2 DUI	.293
Daniel Bidwell	2 DUI	.189
John Blanchard	2 DUI	.14
Robert Christie	3 DUI	REFUSAL
Chris Cooper	3 DUI	REFUSAL
John Finch	2 DUI	REFUSAL
Carl Swingle Jr.	2 DUI	.227
Joseph O'Shea	2 DUI	.199
John Bilock	2 DUI	.28
Scott Allen	2 DUI	REFUSAL & .23
∴ry Ellen Mulally	4 DUI	.26 & .19 & .29 & .14

Edward Prendergast	2	.207;.20
Donald Phillips	2	.11
Samuel Pauciello	2	Refusal; .21
Michael Murphy	3	Ref.;.21; Ref.
Lawrence Gardner	2	.17
Dale Zawicki	2	. 32
Joseph McCarthy	2	.18
Eugene Beckage	2	.14; .13
Gary Hunsinger	3or4	.18
Leroy Metzger	2	.24; .21
Edward Miller	2	.19; .19
cco Minicozzi	3or4	Refusals
Ralph Ricino	4	Ref.; .21
John Rowlands	2	.17; .11
George Sheerer	3	Refusals
Todd Swoyer	4	.23; .21; Ref.
Barbara White	2	.24; .21
Robert Ward	3	.16; .161
Willie Lewis	3or4	Ref; .42
Michael Ligorio	2	.14
Richard Volovitch	2	.142
Daniel Cleveland	4	.20
John Mooney	2	Refusal

Eugene Gallagher	2 DUI	.79 & Refusal
Ellis Heckler	3 DUI	Refusal & .224
Michael Herbert	2 DUI	.170
James Rooney	2 DUI	Refusal
Joseph Worobey	2 DUI	.221

Fred Clark	2 DUI	.13 & REFUSAL
Mike Kahanic	2 DUI	REFUSAL & .132
Joe Surdyrowski	2 DUI	.14 & .10
Jeff Bielinski	2 DUI	.16

CHAIRMAN LLOYD: Thank you very much, Mr. Doyle.

I'm having a problem coming to grips with why the statistics show the reduction. I can see a couple potential explanations for that, and let me put out this hypothetical and see whether I'm on target or not.

One is just heightened public awareness accompanying the enactment of this legislation, and some people believe, in the criminal justice system, that we would have a greater deterrent effect on other potential criminals if we prosecuted like the next day. So that maybe a combination of more public awareness and the fact that it's speedy justice sends a warning that otherwise isn't there.

Do you think that that's a partial explanation for the drop?

MR. DOYLE: I think a large measure of that is the answer. I think you've basically answered the question.

It has been my experience and my observation that the ultimate fear of walking out of that bar and getting in your automobile and being picked up in a roadblock or being picked up under the aegis of one of these measures, one of these Bills, has been sufficient for people to change their habits, and there's been a discernible difference in the states where I've seen these enacted.

CHAIRMAN LLOYD: That brings me to a follow-up, which is that my recollection is that the first couple

years after we passed the tougher drunk driving laws back in '82, '83, whenever that was, that we saw a fairly significant improvement, and now I gather, from what I'm hearing from a lot of people, that has kind of disappeared.

So the question would be: if we adopt this procedure we may have the same experience. I mean has this been in effect in any of these states for five or six years where we can see that there is a dip down, and at least once it went down it stayed there, or that the curve keeps going downward?

MR. DOYLE: I would have to check the curve, but I can tell you that it has been in effect in several states for more than two or three years.

I think that the big difference would be that you still have the criminal justice system that is directing their varying attentions to the ultimate outcome of these cases. I think what this does is somewhat unique in the fact that it has a consistent and perpetual Damocles Sword that hangs over your head, the very recognition that without regard to how adroit your defense attorney is going to be in protecting your interest, you know that you're going to lose your license promptly, decisively and immediately. It's completely different than anything we've tested before in these anti-drunk driving states.

CHAIRMAN LLOYD: But that just raises the very point

 that the prior speaker made, which was -- and you suggested the courts have said that these state statutes have sufficient due process.

MR. DOYLE: Yes, sir.

CHAIRMAN LLOYD: I don't know what has to be in those Bills to make them meet that kind of administrative due process test, but certainly I think that some members would have a problem with a Bill if we were going to say, "You're going to lose your license based on the charge, and you have no opportunity to challenge whether the police officer conducted the test properly." I mean that certainly can't be what you're suggesting.

MR. DOYLE: No, sir. As a matter of fact, I think that this was the fallacy of the arguments that I heard Mr. Mancke articulate. You are not without the due process. As I understand the procedures that are undertaken, you will get a temporary license, which will permit you to raise a due process question if you think that somehow or other there has not been probable cause or some other reason why you should be brought within the aegis of this bill. Failing to do it, then justice will take its due course. You will have your license deprived. But you will always have that safeguard against that deprivation of due process.

I, frankly, thought that that argument fell flat.

 CHAIRMAN LLOYD: I agree with you that I don't think you can just repeal the Constitution just because it's an administrative proceeding, but I guess I'm a little bit concerned that we not walk out of here with the notion that this is a sort of Damocles that is going to fall notwithstanding the skills of the counsel, because you're going to have counsel in the administrative hearing, and he's going to raise, or she's going to raise, basically the same kinds of arguments; and if counsel is sufficiently adept at doing that, the administrative process, or, on appeal, the Commonwealth Court, is going to have to recognize those arguments.

MR. DOYLE: No, I don't see that in this bill. I think the safeguards are there. And, frankly, my first reaction to these Bills when I saw them ran along the lines of Mr. Mancke. I do think that the due process is there. I think they are embodied in the Bill as it is now structured. I think that whatever additional amendments have been hammered out between the DOT and our counsel I think may further address that.

I have no question at all that there is no lack of due process, but it is an absolute assurance that we will be getting people off the road who have no business driving.

I don't see a great deal of difference, as a matter

of fact, between what this bill does and what has been done in other jurisdictions with regard to roadblocks and the implied consent law itself. We're, in effect, saying something a little bit different here. We're talking about an administrative privilege that the state gives to people to operate vehicles on the street. And we're saying as a condition of doing that, you have to assure us that if we put up certain safeguards, you follow them or it gives rise to a right to revoke your privileges.

That is merely, in my judgment, an extension of the implied consent law in that regard.

CHAIRMAN LLOYD: I hear what you're saying and I agree with part of it, but I'm still a little bit concerned that you are assuming that the success rate in these kinds of proceedings is going to be dramatically different from the success rate in a criminal prosecution.

MR. DOYLE: Yes, sir.

CHAIRMAN LLOYD: The testimony from the District
Attorney of Lackawanna County is that we might have five to
ten percent more people who are arrested for drunk driving
would lose their license under this process as compared
with the current law, which requires a finding beyond a
reasonable doubt.

Do you agree with his estimate?

MR. DOYLE: No. Based upon the statistics that have

already been amassed in Maryland, it goes far beyond that. We're talking about 37,000 suspensions within the first two years.

CHAIRMAN LLOYD: Compared to what? I mean I guess we need to compare that to what would have happened if they hadn't done anything.

MR. DOYLE: No, sir. That is on the basis of the enactment of this law. The first year after this law was enacted they suspended 17,000-plus, the second year was 20,000-plus, and it, indeed, has been working for the purpose of suspension because of violation of the ALR law.

CHAIRMAN LLOYD: I guess I'm not making myself clear.

MR. DOYLE: I'm sorry.

CHAIRMAN LLOYD: Let me try to make it simple. What we need to be able to see -- and I realize you may not have the statistics, but one of the things that we need to be able to see is: take a state which has a procedure like this; how many people lost their license through the criminal justice system as a result of a conviction for DUI in the last two years before this procedure went into effect, and then, after this procedure went into effect, how many people lost their license as a result of the criminal justice system, plus how many lost their license as a result of the administrative procedure, so that we can

make a comparison. Just saying that 37,000 people lost their license, without knowing -- maybe there were 35,000, or maybe there were 40,000 who lost them over the preceding two years. That's the comparison I'm looking for.

MR. DOYLE: I'll see if I can get that information for you, Mr. Chairman. I would only add to that, the other thing that probably we wouldn't be able to find out is how many of those people who have been suspended may conceivably have been kept off the road under other circumstances while they were waiting on the criminal justice system to discharge whatever their problems were. They may have gotten involved in a subsequent accident.

CHAIRMAN LLOYD: Well, you see, that's the other part. When you said deterrence is the major issue, I can understand that because otherwise it's a time machine. If I'm going to take the guy's license for a year, and I take it sooner, he's got it back sooner. And if he's a DUI guy, he's going to go out there and do that again. The only question is: is he going to do it while he's waiting trial, or is he going to do it in the first six months after he's gotten his license back from an administrative suspension? Nobody has presented any evidence to suggest that it makes any difference in terms of, over a five-year period of time, how many times that guy goes out and drives drunk.

 MR. DOYLE: I don't know that it could be quantified. It just is our sense that the existence of this law tells people that this decisive reaction to their improper driving is something that deters them more than the probabilities that they may be picked up and convicted at some future time.

CHAIRMAN LLOYD: Other members who have questions? Representative Tigue.

REPRESENTATIVE TIGUE: Just to continue with what Bill Lloyd said, why would such a system in Maryland, or in Pennsylvania, or in any other state, cause more licenses to be suspended since you're not changing the law? You're still saying that if you're driving with .10, you're driving with .10, you're DUI. Why would this incur more arrests?

MR. DOYLE: Well, you are changing the law, because you're adding an administrative penalty or an administrative sanction where it didn't exist before, and it does nothing to eliminate the fact that you still have the criminal charges --

REPRESENTATIVE TIGUE: But we're not changing the law for the crime. The crime is DUI; that doesn't change. The only thing we change, or the only thing that is being proposed of changing -- I don't know what Maryland does -- is that we've changed the minimum sentence in 1942, and in

the amendment, I understand, from one to three months.

Other than that, the crime hasn't changed. In fact, this doesn't apply to all DUIs, because I can be arrested at .065 and be charged with DUI; under this that doesn't happen. So, in essence, this doesn't apply to all DUI arrests.

What I'm saying is, in spite of -- so beyond that, the crime of DUI exists today, and if we pass 1942 we don't change the criteria for DUI.

MR. DOYLE: Not the crime; that's correct.

REPRESENTATIVE TIGUE: That's right.

Why, then, would there be more arrests under that system than there currently is if we haven't changed what the crime is?

MR. DOYLE: I don't know that there will be any more arrests, but there will certainly be more suspensions. We will be getting more people who cause a threat on the roads, off the roads, decisively and immediately, once they've been picked up while they've been driving with alcohol.

REPRESENTATIVE TIGUE: But the point is, if the arrests are the same, why should there be more suspensions? The suspensions should be the same. The only thing this should change is -- and this is where I have a problem based on what you're saying. If the number of arrests are

the same, the number of the suspensions should be the same. If you're saying there will be more suspensions as a result of the same number of arrests, then that tells me that there's something that's going to cause people to lose their license that is later going to be overturned. There shouldn't be any difference.

MR. DOYLE: That's correct, because under the current system people who go before the court of justice, certainly, on the first go-around, oftentimes, in most cases, do not get a suspension. It's been my experience in the state in which I reside, that the first thing --

REPRESENTATIVE TIGUE: In Pennsylvania you have to get a suspension; it's mandated. It's mandated in Pennsylvania. You have to get a suspension.

MR. DOYLE: There is no such thing as probation before judgment?

REPRESENTATIVE TIGUE: No. You have to get a suspension. You could get a one-month suspension and ARD.

MR. DOYLE: With conviction.

REPRESENTATIVE TIGUE: Right.

REPRESENTATIVE SNYDER: Even without.

CHAIRMAN LLOYD: Even with ARD you're supposed to get a suspension.

MR. DOYLE: I'm not familiar with the local law there, and I apologize for that. I'll have my counsel

defer that, but I can't do it.

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REPRESENTATIVE TIGUE: But getting back to the point, the point is that we're not changing the crime. We're changing the punishment, really. We're making the punishment up front, so that the crime, if I commit it now -- ironically, based on what Bill Lloyd, one of his questions, if you think about it, it may be more of a deterrent the way the system is now, because if I'm arrested for DUI, and I have a pending trial, I am more apt to be careful until after -- I don't want to get arrested again before my trial. If you do it this way, I'm going to get my license back faster, especially with a minimum sentence. If I get my license taken today, it begins today, by the time I even get to the court, even if the suspension is valid, even if I'm guilty, I may get my license back the day I go to court so I can drive legally again. My suspension has already been served.

I guess what I'm saying is, I don't see any advantage to taking a person's license now, because all it's going to do is cause another bureaucracy, and a bigger turnover in time and money, because now we're going to have a longer appeal system for the same thing.

MR. DOYLE: There's two things wrong with that.

First of all, I don't think that the practical experience supports your contention that you're more careful between

the time that you're picked up and the time that you go to trial. There's too many experiences where there are repeat offenders during the pending period. I think that that was testified to by the district attorney here, and our own experience is that.

In addition to that, it seems to me that if there's anything that's going to bring a person under some kind of a review process for their own personal habits, their own driving habits, it's the realization that there's a suspension going on immediately, and you can start to talk about a rehabilitation process at that time, not after the fact. I think until we realize just how deep-seated the problem is with these people we're stopping, we need to do something to keep them off the road. I think this does that where your current system does not.

REPRESENTATIVE TIGUE: Your logic or your feeling doesn't come out in statistics that way. In fact, if you look at insurance-wise, one group of people least likely to have an accident are those who are in selective risk, because they want to get out of selective risk. Therefore, they're more careful.

I'm saying that if I have a pending trial ahead of me, chances are I'm going to be more careful. Is that going to happen to everybody? Of course not. We have people -- and I don't know if you've ever had your license

 suspended, but most people who have their license suspended drive with a suspended license because they have to.

On the other hand, there is a small percentage of people who drive while they're under suspension because they're irresponsible. They're the same people who don't have insurance, and a lot of other things.

You are not going to stop criminals by passing something that's going to punish people with no particular gain from the bill.

MR. DOYLE: I can only go back to the statistics I gave before. In the states in which this has been enacted, there has been a discernible diminution in the amount of alcohol-related deaths. Now, that tells us something.

What caused it...

REPRESENTATIVE TIGUE: Thank you.

CHAIRMAN LLOYD: Representative Fairchild.

REPRESENTATIVE FAIRCHILD: I have two questions,
Mr. Doyle. In Texas I understand they have the Interlock
system.

MR. DOYLE: I'm told that, yes, sir. I'm not familiar with --

REPRESENTATIVE FAIRCHILD: Does your association have any statistics on states which have implemented that type of system?

MR. DOYLE: Not to my knowledge. I can check and

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find that out. I will make those available to the Committee if they are available.

REPRESENTATIVE FAIRCHILD: I would appreciate that.

The second thing is -- and I gathered from one of your answers you were not from this state, but I represent --

MR. DOYLE: I reside in Maryland at the present time, Annapolis.

REPRESENTATIVE FAIRCHILD: I represent two rural areas in Pennsylvania, and over the last few months we have had numerous stop-and-checks by the State Police at night. A lot of these were 700, 800 and 900 cars, with, I think the one was four arrests, and the other one may have been six. The one was return traffic from a Penn State game, by the way.

I guess in rural Pennsylvania we seem to be very aggressively pursuing DUI cases and those who drive on the road.

In contrast, your association constantly gives us figures on Philadelphia and the problems with insurance there.

We get statistics from the Pennsylvania Department of Transportation, or maybe it's the judicial system, that lists the DUI convictions. I took my two counties, compared those to Philadelphia County. Philadelphia County has about five million, I think. My two counties have about 60,000.

I asked the district attorney of Philadelphia

County, I said, "Wait a minute, something is not right here
when you look at the percentage of DUI convictions."

I think at that point the two counties had about the same
as Philadelphia County. He just kind of laughed at me and
he said. "Russ, if you think that our police officers are
going to be charged in any way with stopping anybody for
possible DUI," he said, "you're crazy. We're underfunded.
We've got other serious crimes, and we just are sorry, but
we cannot make that a priority."

I guess my question to you is: have your statistics -- or would you like to comment on how this affects rural Pennsylvania versus urban Pennsylvania, keeping in mind that in rural Pennsylvania my people have to drive -- it's not unusual for them to drive 30 or 40 miles to work. We have no mass transit system whatsoever. We do not have public taxis. A lot of times I think these people get hit extremely hard. Whereby, if you are in a major city that has mass transit and you lose your license, you can get on the bus, or the subway, or the train and get back and forth to work, shopping centers, et cetera, et cetera.

MR. DOYLE: Of course, no law is better than the enforcement of that law by the local authorities. I think

 what you've talked about here are some policy problems that confront the State of Pennsylvania that transcend the issue of this bill.

I guess what I would say to you is I applaud the diligence of the people in your area that are trying to keep irresponsible drivers off the road. And I regret the fact that apparently they're not doing the same thing in Philadelphia. I hope that they will, and I hope that maybe somehow or other this will peak their attention a little bit more if it's enacted so that they will pursue more affirmatively getting these bad drivers identified and properly treated. I think this Bill brings that about.

CHAIRMAN LLOYD: Other questions?

MR. LANDIS: I would like to make a statement. I read two weeks ago that Governor Wilson, in the State of California, has signed legislation that mandates repeat offenders must have an Interlock system on their car, at least if they want to keep their driver's license, from there on out. They have a program that leases it for roughly \$900 a year.

REPRESENTATIVE FAIRCHILD: Is that after conviction?

MR. LANDIS: Repeat offenders. You have the first conviction. The second time, if you want to get your license back, you must have that Interlock system.

I have written to get a copy of that law so we can

look at it.

CHAIRMAN LLOYD: Okay. Thank you very much.

MR. DOYLE: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

CHAIRMAN LLOYD: The next witness is Barry Sweedler from the Office of Safety Recommendations, National Transportation Safety Board.

REPRESENTATIVE PRESTON: Mr. Chairman, if I may, while the gentleman is setting up, in relationship to my good friend Mr. Fairchild's statement here -- and I'm not from Philadelphia, but I found out that, first of all, yes, the policemen do have an awful lot of other duties that they do versus some of the rural areas, but part of our greatest problem, coming from an urban area in Pittsburgh, is that most of the people that we're stopping for DUI are from outside the county and from outside the suburbs, so it is not area of public transportation that offers the choice. And most times, most people who are caught doing DUI are stopped for other reasons other than those roadblocks.

So while you have different roadblocks -- and I hate to put it like this, but you'll find a lot of your local police departments in some of the rural areas are going almost by a quota system and have certain days to write so many tickets to make up the revenue to support their local police department.

CHAIRMAN LLOYD: Thank you.

Mr. Sweedler.

MR. SWEEDLER: Mr. Chairman, members of the Committee, I would like to express my appreciation for allowing me to appear before the Committee on behalf of the National Transportation Safety Board to address a problem here in Pennsylvania that is also -- obviously, it's a nationwide problem. But the Bill that you're talking about today, Administrative License Revocation, the National Transportation Safety Board, believes is the most effective action, the most effective action, a state can take to reduce the drunk driving problem.

There are 31 states that now have this

Administrative License Revocation. Many of them have had
them for many years, Mr. Chairman, and I can address some
of the questions. I'm familiar with what is happening on a
nationwide basis. I'm also familiar with how some of these
measures work, both in our country and in other countries.
So I can address some of the questions and concerns that
have been raised.

You made an excellent point. There were two different, distinct reasons for passing this law. One is a general deterrence measure, reason, because people do not want to lose their driving licenses. All the research shows that the driving license loss is the most effective

 sanction to reduce drunk driving. It stops people before they commit the crime.

The second is it gets the person who does commit the crime off the road quickly. So it has two points. It's not one of the other, it's both.

Mr. Doyle mentioned about the nine percent reduction. That is across-the-board. Some states are 15 or 20 percent, some are a little less. But across-the-board it is nine percent.

Now, in 1990, here in Pennsylvania, 735 people died in alcohol-involved crashes on your highways. If this law had been in effect in 1990, and you just had the same average reduction that other states had, there could have been as many as 66 Pennsylvanians that would still be alive today, and that's every year

There are a couple of other things that have come up. Does the person go right back and drive again even though his license has been taken away? A study conducted for the U.S. Justice Department looked at three states. The most dramatic was North Dakota. There was a 40 percent reduction in what we call recidivism, people that repeat the crime; 40 percent. And they looked at three years before the law went into effect and three years after the law went into effect, so it wasn't an immediate thing.

The other question you raised: do the benefits

continue after a certain break-in time? They do, and primarily because, in conjunction with the law, we have this publicity, there is advertising, there is public information; the public is aware of what is happening.

In the State of California -- you brought up in the State of California -- two years ago they passed Administrative License Revocation. Before the law went into effect, approximately 185,000 licenses had been taken away after convention 185 000. The law went into effect. The first year the police arrested almost 300,000 drunk drivers, which is very similar to the number they arrested in the previous year, but they took away 300,000 licenses. So there was almost an increase of 100,000 licenses that were taken away that would not have been taken away under the old system. And there's many reasons. Every state is a little different.

And I agree, I'm not that familiar with exactly how it works here in Pennsylvania, but there are delaying tactics, there are situations where the judges, even though they're mandated by law to take away the license, they don't take away the license, or they take away the license and then suspend the suspension. But this system is sure.

A question was brought up about loss of jobs.

Studies have been done that job loss does not happen. The one big study -- there was one in New Mexico, there was one

in your neighboring state of Delaware. One-and-a-half percent of the people who lost their licenses lost their jobs, and three of those people were bus drivers. They should have lost their jobs. But people seem to get around. They make arrangements.

There's a period of time where they have this temporary permit. They can make arrangements with family members, with friends. They do not lose jobs.

Another question. The state does not lose money.

These are hard financial times for all states. You're not alone. This system is such that with the reinstatement fees and the monies that come from grants from the federal government, there is anywhere from upwards of \$3 million to \$4 million a year that Pennsylvania could be eligible for by passing this law.

It works. You don't lose jobs. All of what has been brought up before -- the Supreme Court and every court in states where this has been taken before state courts have said that it is constitutional. There have been no court cases which have not found the procedures in these laws to afford due process.

Now, what I would like to do, with the Chairman's permission, I have a 12-minute tape that has been put together by a coalition of 30 groups from the health, safety, police, private industry, government agencies. We

all got together and said, "What can we do to try to get this message out?"

CHAIRMAN LLOYD: We would be happy to look at the tape. My one request would be that if we're going to look at the tape, then if you might try to summarize your written testimony.

MR. SWEEDLER: After the tape, I would just answer questions.

(Whereupon, the videotape was shown.)

(Whereupon, the written testimony and attachments of Mr. Sweedler follow:)



National Transportation Safety Board

Washington, D.C. 20594

TESTIMONY OF

BARRY SWEEDLER

DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF SAFETY RECOMMENDATIONS

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

BEFORE THE

TRANSPORTATION COMMITTEE

OF THE

PENNSYLVANIA HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

REGARDING

ADMINISTRATIVE LICENSE REVOCAITON

OCTOBER 13, 1992

Good morning Chairman Lloyd and Members of the Committee. It is a pleasure to be in Harrisburg today to discuss with you what the National Transportation Safety Board believes to be the single most important step you can take to save lives on the streets and highways of Pennsylvania -- the adoption of an effective administrative license revocation law.

My message to you today is simple: Administrative license revocation (ALR) is the single most effective measure you can adopt to reduce drunk driving. This measure saves lives. Further, there would be savings of millions of dollars in both direct medical costs and indirect societal costs.

The National Transportation Safety Board is an independent Federal agency charged by Congress to investigate transportation accidents, determine their probable cause and make recommendations to prevent their recurrence. The recommendations that arise from our investigations and safety studies are our most important product.

More than four years ago, the Safety Board launched a "Go Team" to Carrollton, Kentucky to investigate the worst alcohol-related highway collision in American history: the collision of a pick-up truck and a church activity bus.

The pick-up truck driver had been drinking and was going the wrong way on an Interstate highway. He survived the accident. The passengers on the bus were not as fortunate -- 27 innocent people died and 34 more suffered injuries when the bus burst into flames. Ninety minutes after the accident, the pick-up truck driver's blood alcohol content measured 0.26 percent.

On the night of the accident, news of the tragedy flashed across the TV screens; it was on the front pages of our newspapers. The deaths of those 27 people caught the nation's attention. People were outraged by the horror caused by one person's impairment and irresponsible behavior. They immediately called for action to prevent this kind of accident from happening again.

That is as it should be. Whenever a life is lost in a transportation accident, solutions to prevent similar incidents should be sought and implemented. Preventing loss of life or injuries is one of the Safety Board's most important missions.

But the problem goes far beyond that one tragedy. Traffic accidents-about half of which involve alcohol -- are the fourth leading cause of death in our country today. Preventing these drunk driving related deaths would cost significantly less than what society pays as a consequence of drunk driving.

In 1990, 44,529 people were killed in traffic accidents in this country. Almost 20,000 of those fatalities involved alcohol. Another 355,000 people suffered injuries in alcohol-related accidents -- an increase from the previous year. In Pennsylvania, 735 persons died in accidents involving alcohol.

Who is a drunk driver? Drunk drivers come in all ages, sexes, shapes, sizes, and races and they drive all kinds of motor vehicles, from motorcycles to tractor trailers.

A recent Safety Board study found that one-third of fatally injured truck drivers tested positive for alcohol or other drugs. Four out of five of these drivers had a history of substance abuse.

The message is clear -- drinking and driving is unacceptable behavior. Only when people's behavior and attitudes are changed will we have done an adequate job of keeping alcohol-impaired drivers off the road. Motorists must be convinced that there is a strong likelihood that if they drive while impaired, they will be promptly penalized.

Most experts agree that many impaired drivers persist in their behavior because they believe they will not be caught and/or convicted. Unfortunately that perception is based on reality. In most jurisdictions that do not have administrative license revocation, experience proves that drivers have little reason to fear apprehension. In fact, the odds of being arrested for driving while impaired are as low as one in one thousand. Stated another way, an intoxicated person can drive from New York to Los Angeles and halfway back without being arrested.

And, even if arrested, their case crawls through the judicial system while the driver is still on the streets and highways. A typical drunk driving case takes an average of 90-120 days to complete. During that time, the driver retains his or her license. All too frequently the subjecteven before being tried for the first offense -- is arrested again for driving while impaired.

Following the Carrollton, Kentucky tragedy, the Safety Board issued a series of recommendations intended to help curb the threat of drunken drivers. The single most important one called for the states, including Pennsylvania, to adopt an administrative license revocation law.

An administrative license revocation law gives a law enforcement officer the authority, on behalf of the state driver licensing agency, to confiscate the license of any driver who either fails or refuses to take a chemical breath test. To be truly effective, the officer must be able to confiscate the license on the spot.

Once a driver's license has been confiscated, the driver is issued a temporary license that is valid for a short, specified period of time. During that time he or she may seek an administrative hearing -- a process that is independent of any criminal proceedings. That hearing addresses a single issue: Did the driver fail or refuse to take a breath test? If the answer is yes, the license is revoked.

The drunk driver is off the road, with no dilatory tactics, no mitigating circumstances, no plea bargaining and no pre-trial diversion. The offender may still face criminal proceedings, but the important thing is that they are off the road in very short order.

Based upon the extensive experience of the 32 jurisdictions that have adopted administrative license revocation, it works. It specifically deters those drivers who are caught drinking and driving from doing it again. And, it generally deters those who have not been caught, because they are afraid of losing their driving privileges.

Opponents of administrative license revocation argue that it is unconstitutional -- that it denies the drunk driver due process. However, not one state court decision on the issue has ruled that ALR is unconstitutional. To the contrary, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that revocation of a license, prior to an administrative hearing, is not a violation of due process as long as there are provisions for a swift post-suspension hearing.

When the Federal Aviation Administration believes that public safety is endangered, it immediately revokes a pilot's license. If the action is appealed to the Safety Board, we are required to issue a decision within 60 days after notice of the revocation. The immediacy of the process helps to insure the safety of the nation's airways. There is no reason why we cannot and should not do at least as much to protect the public on our nation's streets and highways.

The Safety Board's support of ALR is based on sound research and evidence gathered from states that have adopted the procedure. Evidence on its effectiveness is now coming from several of the 32 jurisdictions where it is law. Those reports all reflect positive results.

The CALIFORNIA experience demonstrates how successful ALR can be in removing drunk drivers from our highways. Enacted in 1989, 300,000 drivers who failed or refused sobriety tests had their licenses taken on the spot in the program's first year. Significantly, there were requests for hearings in only three percent (about 8,000) of the cases -- far fewer than had been anticipated.

DELAWARE, when possible, tests all fatally injured drivers for alcohol. When the state compared the number of drinking drivers (those with a BAC greater than 0.05 percent) before and after implementation of its law, it found that number had decreased by 19.1 percent in just one year. A more recent study sponsored by the AAA Foundation for Traffic Safety found a 14 percent decline in the presence of alcohol among fatally injured drivers.

In MINNESOTA the law was aggressively implemented -- and it is working. Administration license revocations for alcohol-related offenses have increased every year since its implementation in 1976. Roadside surveys in 1975 and 1985 revealed a 60 percent reduction in the number of drivers on the road after midnight with a BAC level of 0.10 percent or higher -- a drop from one driver in ten to only one in 24.

OKLAHOMA, reports a "significant decrease" in the incidence of drinking and driving after implementation of its law in 1982. In the year after the law took effect, overall traffic fatalities decreased 20 percent and alcohol-

related fatalities declined 30 percent. And in the first two years of the program, alcohol involvement in <u>all</u> highway accidents declined 41 percent. Officials in Oklahoma consider administrative license revocation to be the single most important element in their anti-drunk driving program.

OREGON has experienced a reduction in the number of test refusal hearings since it enacted an administrative license revocation law. Prior to 1984, hearings were requested in 50 percent of the implied consent test refusal cases. Today only 19 percent of those drivers who have had their licenses suspended ask for a hearing.

The safety benefit to the state has been significant. The percentage of alcohol-related, night-time, single vehicle accidents with serious injury decreased 15-20 percent when the law was implemented. This reduction was still evident two years later. Also, DWI convictions reportedly have increased dramatically -- possibly because the penalty for refusing a test is more severe than the revocation penalty. An extensive public relations campaign was critical to the state's success -- 85 percent of those surveyed were aware of the law and its provisions.

It is interesting to compare Oregon's experience with that of its sister state of Washington, which does not have an ALR law. In 1982, in both states, 63 percent of all highway fatalities were alcohol-related. By 1990, progress had been made in both states. In Washington, alcohol-related fatalities had dropped to 57 percent, a reduction of 9.5 percent. However, in Oregon, alcohol-related fatalities had dropped to 47 percent, a reduction of 25 percent. Comparing drivers in fatal crashes with a BAC at or above .10 percent produces a similar result. Although we can not conclusively determine the reasons for these differences, the evidence points to ALR as a major causal factor.

WISCONSIN examined the general and specific deterrent effects of its 1982 law mandating a three to six month suspension for first time convictions. General deterrence effects were measures by examining a surrogate measure for alcohol involvement -- late night, single vehicle injury crashes involving male drivers. The results showed a substantial reduction in this surrogate measure for alcohol involved crashes. A companion study of those drivers whose licenses were suspended under the law had fewer subsequent convictions and accidents. The authors of this study concluded that "100% mandatory license suspension is an effective legal sanction against drinking and driving."

In addition, they experienced a substantial reduction in the number of night-time fatal single vehicle accidents. Based upon the success of license sanctions under its 1982 law, Wisconsin adopted a full administrative revocation law in 1987.

NEW MEXICO, has experienced only a one percent rate of hearing requests under its 1984 law. A time-series analysis by H. Laurence Ross in 1986 of alcohol-related fatal accident statistics, before and after implementation of the law, found that the percentage of fatally-injured drivers with a BAC greater that 0.05 percent fell from 66 to 56 percent.

Few NEVADA drivers were aware of the state's ALR law when it was enacted and, as a result, no change in the number of alcohol-related night-time accidents was noted in the first year. However, following a public information campaign that emphasized license revocation, alcohol-related accidents declined by 12 percent.

One of the most important studies of the issue was conducted by the Insurance Institute for Highway Safety (IIHS). This study examined the effects of administrative license revocation and other laws on fatal accidents in selected states. IIHS concluded that administrative license revocation laws were the most effective of the laws studied. Between 6:00 PM and 6:00 AM -- when more than half of all fatally injured drivers had BACs over 0.10 percent -- administrative license revocation is estimated to have reduced the involvement of drivers in fatal accidents by nine percent. That would have meant 66 lives saved in Pennsylvania in 1990.

A U.S. Department of Justice study demonstrates that states with an ALR law have reduced recidivism rates among drinking/driving offenders. The most startling effect was found in North Dakota. The rate of recidivism declined by nearly 40 percent, suggesting the potential for long-term behavior modification. This study is consistent with others that indicate, even though some drivers will continue to drive after revocation, they tend to drive less frequently and more cautiously. Most important, however, is the fact that most drivers adhere to the law and do not drive at all.

Mr. Chairman, the Safety Board recognizes that these are difficult financial times for most state governments. It recognizes the necessity for new legislation to be cost effective and at least revenue neutral. Start-up and first year operating expenses of an administrative license revocation law have been less than \$1 million, and rarely have they exceeded \$500,000. All states have been able to recover their costs by charging license reinstatement fees. In fact, a recent study in Illinois, Nevada and Mississippi found that each collected more in reinstatement fees than it spent in start-up and annual operating costs. Revenues generated were 1.3 to 2 times greater than required. Perhaps more significantly, the societal cost-savings realized from fewer highway accidents in the three states was over \$230 million -- \$230 million that could be used for other programs. In Pennsylvania, these savings would be \$44.9 million per year.

The concern that the loss of driving privileges, especially in rural areas, would result in the loss of a job, prompted studies in New Mexico, Mississippi and Delaware to determine whether the concern is justified. In all three states, the problem was minimal. For example, in Delaware, a rural state with little public transit, only 1.2 percent of all whose licenses were revoked lost their jobs -- a group that included two school bus drivers. Loss of employment resulting from the loss of a driver's license is unusual.

The public clearly recognizes the threat to public safety posed by drunk drivers. Public opinion surveys have shown that a large majority of the public supports administrative license revocation. According to a Louis Harris poll, 89 percent of those surveyed endorsed automatic license

revocation. In a survey published in the Journal of Public Health Policy, 67 percent of the respondents favored an immediate 90-day suspension of a driver's license for anyone arrested for DMI.

Likewise, administrative license revocation is supported by the U.S. Surgeon General. It has been adopted as a Year 2000 health goal by the Department of Health and Human Services.

The only opposition to ALR seems to come from those who perceive that ALR will cause them an economic loss. This includes some segments of the alcoholic beverage industry, and the trial and criminal defense bar. However, there is no credible evidence or study supporting the myth of economic loss.

In summary, the Safety Board urges Pennsylvania to adopt administrative license revocation. The program:

- Revokes the licenses of dangerous drivers more expediently;
- Dramatically increases the certainty of receiving a penalty for drunk driving;
- Deters driving while drinking both by those whose licenses have been suspended and by those who have not;
- 4. Is cost effective and may even generate revenue; and
- 5. Is supported by the public, and most importantly,
- 6. It saves lives.

Thank you for inviting the Safety Board to testify about the single most important legislation you can enact to save lives on the streets and highways of Pennsylvania. I would be happy to answer any questions you may have, and please let me know if the Safety Board can be of further assistance.



PENNSYLVANIA

Administrative License Revocation Fact Sheet

In 1990 there were an estimated 735 alcohol-involved fatalities in Pennsylvania, according to Fatal Accident Reporting System data.

A Pennsylvania Administrative License Revocation (ALR) Law would produce the following benefits each year, based on estimates from current research.

Yearly Savings

44 to 66	Lives
\$ 5.2 to 7.8 Million	Direct Costs (medical, rehabilitation, etc.)
\$29.9 to 44.9 Million	Societal Costs (lost productivity plus direct costs)

A Pennsylvania ALR law could make the State eligible for Federal incentive grant funds.

\$2.34 Million annual Section 408 Grant, if Pennsylvania meets the basic and all supplemental grant criteria. The funds are available annually for five years.

In addition, a Pennsylvania ALR law would help Pennsylvania qualify for Section 410 grant funds. The 1991 Highway Bill authorized \$25 million annually for all States from 1993 through 1997 for the Section 410 program.

For more information on Administrative License Revocation, contact:

Frank Altobelli, Regional Administrator National Highway Traffic Safety Administration Phone: 301-768-7111 Fax: 301-768-7118

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- The fatality reduction estimates are based upon a National Highway Traffic Safety Administration-sponsored study of Administrative License Revocation (ALR) law effects on single vehicle nighttime fatal crashes (6% reduction) and an Insurance Institute for Highway Safety study of ALR effects on fatal crashes during periods of high alcohol involvement (9% reduction). If you assume that ALR has a similar effect on all alcohol-involved crashes, the yearly savings estimates in the Pact Sheet are obtained by applying these percentage reductions to the 1990 Fatal Accident Reporting System (FARS) estimates of alcohol-related fatalities in Pennsylvania.
- Cost estimates are based on figures developed for a 1991 Federal Highway Administration study, "The Costs of Highway Crashes."
- The direct cost estimate is composed of medical, property damage, legal and court, emergency services, insurance administration, workplace, and travel delay costs. Direct costs were \$118,400 per fatality in 1990 dollars. Lost productivity was estimated at \$561,800 per fatality in 1990. The total societal cost per fatality in 1990, both direct costs and lost productivity, was \$680,200.
- Although ALR reduces alcohol-involved injury and property damage crashes as well as
 fatalities, there are no studies that provide conclusive data on these reductions.
 Consequently, the savings estimates do not include any impact on property damage
 and injury crashes.

 CHAIRMAN LLOYD: Thank you very much.

Other members questions?

REPRESENTATIVE LESCOVITZ: I just have a couple of questions, basically, two. I'm going on what you said earlier and on the videotape.

You said in California there were, in 1990, 180,000 convictions.

MR. SWEEDLER: Right.

REPRESENTATIVE LESCOVITZ: And you said in 1991, there were 300,000 suspensions.

MR. SWEEDLER: Right -- no; I said that there were approximately 180,000 licenses taken away, of the people who were arrested. Because there were many more convicted who actually didn't lose their license. They were given hardship licenses, they were --

REPRESENTATIVE LESCOVITZ: How many would that be?

MR. SWEEDLER: I don't have that. I could get the numbers.

REPRESENTATIVE LESCOVITZ: Do you have a guess? Two hundred thousand?

MR. SWEEDLER: No, no.

REPRESENTATIVE LESCOVITZ: Ninety thousand?

MR. SWEEDLER: It was somewhere between the number that were arrested, approximately 300,000, and the 180,000 that actually had their licenses suspended.

The suspensions were suspended. The cases never got to the final point. People were not convicted. All of these reasons added up to the --

REPRESENTATIVE LESCOVITZ: There were 180,000 convictions --

MR. SWEEDLER: No, no. There were 180,000 who lost their licenses.

REPRESENTATIVE LESCOVITZ: Okay. So it means they had to be convicted in order to lose their license.

MR. SWEEDLER: But there were many more that were convicted that did not lose their license.

REPRESENTATIVE LESCOVITZ: How many? A guess.

MR. SWEEDLER: As I said, it would just be a guess. I don't know.

REPRESENTATIVE LESCOVITZ: Would it be closer to 180,000 or closer to 300,000?

MR. SWEEDLER: It could have been 30,000 or 40,000. I don't know.

REPRESENTATIVE LESCOVITZ: So let's guess high; that would be 220,000, 225,000. So there were 75,000 people the next year that were suspended but not necessarily convicted.

I don't understand how you get the 85 percent rate upheld that you had on the --

MR. SWEEDLER: These were of the 300,000 people who

had their licenses taken by the police officers.

REPRESENTATIVE LESCOVITZ: In 1991.

MR. SWEEDLER: In 1991. Of the people who asked for a hearing -- and that number was fairly low, the people who asked for a hearing; it was about seven percent of the people who had their licenses taken away asked for a hearing. Of those people who asked for a hearing, 85 percent of them were upheld by the -- I mean the state was upheld. So in 15 percent of the cases there was a reversal. The hearing officer believed that there was not enough evidence. So in 15 percent of the cases that were brought before the administrative hearing process, the license was given back.

REPRESENTATIVE LESCOVITZ: I'm trying to figure this out percentwise. Two hundred fifty thousand, that still doesn't come up to 85 percent.

MR. SWEEDLER: It's only 85 percent of the small number that appealed. Most people did not appeal.

REPRESENTATIVE LESCOVITZ: Okay. It's not 85 percent of the 300,000 --

MR. SWEEDLER: No; it's not 85 percent of the 300,000. It's only 85 percent of the 20,000 that appealed.

REPRESENTATIVE LESCOVITZ: That was a little bit confusing.

The other question has to do with suspension. In

these states where someone is suspended as of day one when they are caught under DUI, and they have a 30-day temporary license, and then they appeal it and the Department of Transportation says, "No, you should lose your license," on the 31st day they get caught speeding, meaning they're driving under suspension" --

MR. SWEEDLER: Right.

REPRESENTATIVE LESCOVITZ: Do you know what happens if they are, in the future, proved innocent under the DUI? What happens to that suspension, the driving under suspension situation? Are they still suspended because they were driving under suspension or what?

MR. SWEEDLER: Well, it's rather technical. I'm sure it varies from state to state, but the main point is that they did not have the permission of the state to drive when they were picked up for speeding. That would be handled as an offense of driving without a permit.

REPRESENTATIVE LESCOVITZ: In most states then the driving under suspension would still be upheld even though they should have never been driving -- if we were under this process, they really wouldn't have been driving under suspension the way the law is now.

MR. SWEEDLER: The way the law is now they would have been awaiting their court date, say, so they would have been driving legally.

 REPRESENTATIVE LESCOVITZ: So now we're going to suspend 75,000 people, and under that -- at least 75,000 in California.

MR. SWEEDLER: But keep in mind, these were people who were legally arrested by the police for DWI, for committing what the police feel is an indictable crime.

REPRESENTATIVE LESCOVITZ: I guess I'm looking at other amendments to this Bill, but there's no state that you know of that relieves that person from that suspension or conviction of driving while under suspension?

MR. SWEEDLER: I could do a check for you. I mean, no, not sitting here, off the top of my head, I don't, but I have a list of all the states and all the laws, and I can take a look at that and get back to the Committee on that. I will be glad to do that.

REPRESENTATIVE LESCOVITZ: Thank you.

CHAIRMAN LLOYD: Other questions?

Representative Fairchild.

REPRESENTATIVE FAIRCHILD: I saw on the program that San Antonio was one of the sponsors of the 12-minute video, at the end where they gave the credits.

MR. SWEEDLER: Yes. I think the police officers were from San Antonio, yes.

REPRESENTATIVE FAIRCHILD: Texas has an Interlock?

MR. SWEEDLER: They are starting to use Interlock.

that?

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 REPRESENTATIVE FAIRCHILD: Does San Antonio have

MR. SWEEDLER: I think San Antonio may be one of the sites.

REPRESENTATIVE FAIRCHILD: Going back to Attorney Mancke, how are they tied in to the Interlock?

MR. SWEEDLER: Let me explain. We're starting to get some evaluation of the Interlock programs. It has been used in California and in some other places, and there have been some evaluations.

The Interlock seems to be effective in preventing the driving habits while someone is intoxicated while it is on the car. But as soon as you take it off the car, the people are back to their old behavior. So it's a temporary thing unless you put it on the car forever.

REPRESENTATIVE FAIRCHILD: So is suspending a license.

MR. SWEEDLER: But suspending a license -- as I was saying, we're talking about two different groups of people. The people that are actually offenders, are caught, and you're dealing with them through the Interlock, through rehabilitation, that's one group. And, by the way, that group is not the major cause of DWI crashes in this country. They only make up 25 percent of the fatalities, comes from the people who have offended once before and

been caught. Seventy-five percent of the fatalities are people who have never been caught. They are the ones that are deterred by this law. So we're deterring both. That's the big thing that sometimes people have a hard time in grasping.

REPRESENTATIVE FAIRCHILD: That contradicts what the district attorney said. He said the problem was the repeat DUIs. Now you say 75 percent of the problem --

MR. SWEEDLER: It's certainly a problem. Twentyfive percent of your 700 people who died, that's certainly
many, many lives that are deterred.

REPRESENTATIVE FAIRCHILD: We all realize that.

MR. SWEEDLER: But it is two separate issues. So, certainly, we have to do something.

The district attorney brought up the question of seeing if a person was not addicted to alcohol before giving them back their license. They're now doing that in four countries in Europe. They're doing that in Great Britain, in Germany, the Netherlands and in Sweden; they're doing that. You just can't get your license back when your 90 days is up. You have to prove, through a medical doctor, that you're not addicted to the alcohol any longer to get your license back.

We don't have that in this country, but I think we're starting to think about things like that.

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REPRESENTATIVE FAIRCHILD: Attorney Mancke kind of alluded to, I think, maybe a compromise situation here where you could have the ALR, but instead of immediately taking the license, you put the Interlock device on, let due process take its course. If that person wanted to appeal, I assume they would still have the Interlock on during the appeal.

Would you like to comment on that?

MR. SWEEDLER: I have never heard of that, but it is certainly an interesting proposal. It certainly would take the person -- that person would not drink and drive. But you are still losing the deterrent effect for the general population who don't want to lose their legal privilege to This way, they've been picked up for DWI. drive. they've got the money, they can plunk down the \$800 or \$900, or I think the attorney mentioned that we ought to make funds available to pay for anyone that didn't have it, but they're not punished. They're still driving legally after having been detected, tested and arrested for DWI. That is one of the differences.

REPRESENTATIVE FAIRCHILD: I think a person, given a choice, would have to take a very good look at that choice, because, as you know, these devices are expensive. she would have upcoming court costs and an appeal. going back to your statistic, and I think it was your

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 statistic, that only seven percent asked for hearings on appeals anyway --

MR. SWEEDLER: In that state, right.

REPRESENTATIVE FAIRCHILD: -- so we're dealing with less than seven percent --

MR. SWEEDLER: Well, it's the same thing like the choice, and you're recognizing it's a different level of proof that's needed. It's like if a health inspector went into a licensed food place and found some problems there, would he give the proprietor a choice and say, "Well, we'll let you have a choice"? You should shut that place down if it's a threat to people's health, just like having a person on the roads with a driver's license legally after the police know that person is a threat.

It's an interesting concept, and it can probably be built into any kind of a system, but if you don't have the threat of taking the license away on the spot, you're losing the general deterrent, which is probably the bigger effect, because it changes people's behavior before they commit the act.

REPRESENTATIVE FAIRCHILD: I agree with Representative Tigue's assumption, and I guess maybe we need a psychologist or whatnot, but it seems to me that if a person is arrested, and this is hanging on their head, that they are going to be very hesitant before they go out

and do the same crime while they are waiting.

MR. SWEEDLER: No disagreement, but we saw from the district attorney's figures that many, many, many people do. And we know, and I didn't -- in my long statement that I submitted for the record, we do cite some instances where terrible -- in fact, we did a study back in the early '80s where we looked at 50 cases where people had committed the crime of drunk driving and then committed another crash, many of them fatal crashes, and we looked at the second case to go back and find where did the system fail to allow that person to commit that offense again.

That certainly is a problem, but, as I say, you have to recognize that we're talking about two different things. We're talking about the person who does offend and the general public.

Just like you talked about the roadblocks. You don't have a sobriety checkpoint or roadblock to catch drunk drivers. If you caught four, three, out of 700 or 800, you're deterring the general population, because they say, "I don't want to get caught, so I'll think about drinking and driving."

So it's a general deterrent on one hand, but it also works on the repeat offender to try to get that person to change their behavior. And they do.

REPRESENTATIVE FAIRCHILD: What did that report of

the 50 cases show?

MR. SWEEDLER: There were all kinds of different problems. There were some judicial problems. There were problems with people getting a slap on the wrist on the first offense. There were hardcore people who should have gotten treatment and got maybe an education course, where they really should have gone into long-term treatment. There was a whole host of problems.

But the study did show us that taking away the license is the most effective thing that can be done. The sureness and the certainty that the license will be taken away if the offense is committed turned out to be the number one deterrent that makes people think twice.

CHAIRMAN LLOYD: Representative Tigue.

REPRESENTATIVE TIGUE: I agree with you about taking away the license, but when you talk about Pennsylvania, you're not talking about California or Delaware or Texas. Pennsylvania currently, if you are found guilty of DUI, you lose your license. There are no exceptions. There is no bread-and-butter license or limited license; you lose your license. That is the deterrent.

When you say that you lose it immediately, that's not true, because according to the proposal, I don't lose my -- I hand my license, or I exchange my license --

MR. SWEEDLER: Your permanent license, yes.

 REPRESENTATIVE TIGUE: So I can do everything I did yesterday for the next month.

MR. SWEEDLER: The difference is, that piece of plastic is a valuable asset to most people. When you go in to cash a check or use a credit card, you're going to show someone your temporary driver's license; it's embarrassing. They don't want that. That piece of plastic is so important to the individual --

REPRESENTATIVE TIGUE: But, again, the point is we're talking about taking people who may cause a danger off the highways. We're not talking about embarrassing them or putting them in a position where they can't cash checks, that they can't do their work, et cetera.

The point is, we do in Pennsylvania everything the ALR does, according to that screen, except our criminal justice system is delayed in hearing. All this proposal does is to take that delay and give it to someone else and set up another layer. It doesn't -- we can change the penalties without doing this, and this does change the penalties from one to three months minimum.

MR. SWEEDLER: But it has a different impression on the public.

REPRESENTATIVE TIGUE: I don't believe that. I mean I've had my license suspended. I've had one driving ticket, one ticket in my life, for speeding. I lost my

license. That's when the law was that we went to an administrative hearing board.

I was driving at 16 miles an hour over the speed limit on Interstate 81. I lost my license.

Was that a fair system? Well, I didn't think it was at the time, especially since it was my first offense. Secondly, that system has been changed. That had to do with interstates.

The point is that what we're saying -- I don't know anyone who wants someone who is driving drunk to be on the highways or roads or courts or whatever, but the point is that this proposal doesn't do anything more than what -- the current law does what you want it to do. If you're found guilty, we suspend the license. Absolutely. No exceptions. Can't use California because it doesn't apply to Pennsylvania. If you go through the hearing system and you're found guilty, you lose your license. If you go through the hearing system and you're found not guilty, you should not lose your license.

The problem is, under this system, because -- those of us who deal with PennDOT can understand. When you get into administrative problems, we will have a number of cases, as Representative Lescovitz said, where we will have people who eventually will be found not guilty, who probably shouldn't have been stopped in the first place,

who now are driving on a temporary permit, or it may have been expired, but because of bureaucratic problems or problems with policemen filling out forms or getting it in the mail, et cetera, the person now is caught in limbo.

To use Illinois as an example. Mike Carroll was involved in a situation I had in Illinois where Pennsylvania, for six months, was allowing this driver for DUI to be put back on the roads. Illinois to this day will not allow him to drive in Illinois because he has to show proof that he has insurance for three years, even though he is carried on an insurance policy at his house.

These are the kind of bureaucratic problems we're going to run into. What I'm saying is if the criminal justice system is backlogged, and that's where the problem seems to be, why do we now want to take the chance of taking people's licenses, not for those who are guilty but for those who are going to be found not guilty?

MR. SWEEDLER: The experience in other states -REPRESENTATIVE TIGUE: We're talking about
Pennsylvania.

MR. SWEEDLER: Pennsylvania is not unique. I mean Pennsylvania is not the only state that has that system. There are many states that have the same system.

The thing is that the administrative hearings are not requested by most people. That has been proven in

 every state, from Florida to California to Illinois to
Maryland, Delaware. People accept it. "You got me. I'm
caught. I'll serve out my suspension and get my license
back." That's the difference.

REPRESENTATIVE TIGUE: That's done in Pennsylvania now, though. Most people -- the only reason --

MR. SWEEDLER: People do go to court.

REPRESENTATIVE TIGUE: The only reason people go to court in Pennsylvania now is because the court is the one who can give them the minimum sentence with the ARD. That's the only reason they go to court. They don't go to court and plead -- they don't plead not guilty, they plead guilty. But they have to go to court to be given the ARD and the minimum sentence; otherwise, they get the maximum penalty for a first-time offender. That's why you go to court.

MR. SWEEDLER: But that could be six months later, three months later, a year later, and the person is not connecting the offense with what is happening to them a year later.

REPRESENTATIVE TIGUE: Sure they are.

MR. SWEEDLER: Well, we have a difference of opinion.

REPRESENTATIVE TIGUE: I mean I get people every week, as do a number of other people, who come in my office

with a suspended license. They understand what the problem is.

MR. SWEEDLER: I can just tell you what happens in other places and how it's gone into effect and how it has worked, and how effective it has been.

REPRESENTATIVE TIGUE: I agree with that, but what I'm saying is we already do what ALR has put into place in a number of other states. The only difference is we have a backlog, and we look at Mike Barrasse's --

MR. SWEEDLER: But that's a major, major impact on the person's psyche about not knowing with sureness it is going to take place and how quickly it will take place.

That's a big difference. You may not think so, but I guess the researchers tell us that it does.

REPRESENTATIVE TIGUE: One other comment. It has nothing to do, but just a comment Mr. Sweedler mentioned. When you mentioned the four countries, Germany, the Netherlands, Great Britain --

MR. SWEEDLER: Sweden.

REPRESENTATIVE TIGUE: -- and Sweden. It's interesting that you have to get approval by a medical doctor. It's also interesting that they have either socialized or national health insurance.

MR. SWEEDLER: I'm not sure all of them do.

REPRESENTATIVE TIGUE: Sure they do, absolutely do,

every one of them.

REPRESENTATIVE PRESTON: They also have a better health system.

MR. SWEEDLER: I'm not saying that you should do that. I'm just saying no one has done that in this country.

REPRESENTATIVE TIGUE: I'm just saying it's interesting that they all have the people who don't have to go to the doctor to pay for the rehabilitation.

CHAIRMAN LLOYD: Are there other questions?

REPRESENTATIVE PRESTON: Just a quick comment. I am in the middle of this whole thing, really, right now. But the only thing that I'm seeing, hearing the questions, is the greatest problem that we have in this state, and that I see about the driver's license, is that most of the people who know they're supposed to send it in, never send it in, don't give it up anyway. It's causing a large problem once they have been suspended. I can see an advantage to that point.

MR. SWEEDLER: Taking it on the spot. Yes, that's a good point.

REPRESENTATIVE PRESTON: Because it prohibits -- a lot of people would have had less problems, at least legal problems, if they had just taken it in anyway, because it starts compounding, versus if they had taken it, they would

have had to deal with the system. At some time the system would have worked in their favor just naturally.

CHAIRMAN LLOYD: Two quick questions of fact.

Number one, the significant increase in suspensions in California, would I be correct that that was primarily attributable to a reduction in the burden of proof?

MR. SWEEDLER: And also the court system in California allowed judges, or, in many cases, even though they're not allowed, they still -- even though California had a similar law which required suspension, mandatory suspension, the judges would suspend the suspension. They would say, "You're suspended for 90 days. I suspend that suspension. Be good. If I see you back in here, then I'll take it." So a lot of the cases were those types of cases.

But there were a segment with a difference in level of evidence; yes, sir.

CHAIRMAN LLOYD: Do you have any idea -- we had testimony from the Lackawanna County district attorney estimating maybe five to ten percent more suspensions because of standard of evidence. Do you think that's a reasonable ballpark estimate?

MR. SWEEDLER: It varies from state to state and how the system works. I know I looked at the State of Washington and the State of Oregon, two states that are very close in the makeup of their population. They always

talk about the northwest. Oregon has ALR, Washington does not. Oregon suspends approximately the same number of licenses of those arrested, Washington was like half, through the legal system, through other means. Even though they were required by law to take the license, it just didn't happen.

CHAIRMAN LLOYD: The second question is if you could

CHAIRMAN LLOYD: The second question is if you could possibly provide us with some statistics, because the proof is in the pudding, whether this is a long-term effect.

MR. SWEEDLER: Sure.

CHAIRMAN LLOYD: I don't know if you've got states where you have five years' experience or something more than a couple.

MR. SWEEDLER: I do discuss some of those in my statement, and we'll try to put some additional information together for you.

CHAIRMAN LLOYD: Thank you very much.

REPRESENTATIVE TIGUE: Just one follow-up question.
You mentioned Washington. Is Washington half of them?

MR. SWEEDLER: Almost half.

REPRESENTATIVE TIGUE: Are not suspended?

MR. SWEEDLER: Right.

REPRESENTATIVE TIGUE: Even though they're found guilty? They're the guilty people or number of arrests?

MR. SWEEDLER: Most of those are found guilty and

still not suspended.

REPRESENTATIVE TIGUE: But not half of them?

MR. SWEEDLER: Close to half in Washington.

REPRESENTATIVE TIGUE: Are found guilty and not suspended?

MR. SWEEDLER: Right.

REPRESENTATIVE TIGUE: Thank you.

CHAIRMAN LLOYD: Thank you.

MR. SWEEDLER: You're welcome.

CHAIRMAN LLOYD: The next witness is Sherry Walker from Mothers Against Drunk Driving.

MS. WALKER: MADD Pennsylvania thanks the distinguished members of this Committee for the opportunity to testify here today in support of administrative license suspension.

Any elementary school teacher will tell you that the most effective way to maintain order and discipline in the classroom is to insure that any necessary punishment is administered swiftly and uniformly. This same approach is acknowledged by many to be equally effective in reducing the incidence of certain undesirable, even criminal, behaviors -- including driving under the influence.

Most states have traditionally based licensing actions against drivers charged with DUI on a conviction for the offense. Unfortunately, the wheels of the criminal

justice system often grind extremely slowly so that convictions are not always swift and certain in drunk driving cases. Case backlogs, plea bargaining, dilatory tactics employed by a clever defense attorney, and pretrial or pre-conviction diversion programs raise the national average time from arrest to license suspension based upon conviction to about 120 days. In many states, including Pennsylvania, the average is much higher -- from six to eight months.

Clearly, in order to insure the greatest impact, and to be an effective deterrent, sanctions must be applied as soon as possible after the offense. In order for license suspensions to be swift and sure, and thus have the desired deterrent effect, they just be imposed administratively rather than following a conviction.

Administrative license suspension allows the arresting officer to immediately confiscate the license of a driver who either fails an approved test for blood alcohol or refuses to be tested. The arresting officer issues a temporary driving permit, which affords the offender time to appeal the suspension in an administrative process.

If the offender does not appeal, or if the appeal is not upheld, the offender loses his or her license for the legally prescribed period.

 The important point about this process is that license suspension occurs regardless of the outcome of a criminal trial. The consequences of the irresponsible act of drunk driving are thus immediate and can have a profound impact on the offender.

This impact has been measured in a study conducted by the Insurance Institute for Highway Safety. In this study, the number of traffic crashes in states with administrative suspension laws was compared to the number of crashes in states without such laws.

The study concluded that ALS laws reduced fatal nighttime crashes (those most likely to involve alcohol) by about nine percent. Several other studies have demonstrated similar findings.

Although nine percent seems like a small reduction, it translates in Pennsylvania alone into a yearly savings of 66 lives, \$7.8 million in direct medical and rehabilitation costs, and \$37.1 million in lost productivity.

These savings more than make up for the costs incurred in implementing an administrative license suspension program. Even the absolute highest estimate of \$750,000 pales in comparison to the potential lives saved and the reduced cost to society.

In addition to these significant savings, a

Pennsylvania ALS law could make the state eligible for federal incentive 408 grant funds in excess of \$2.34 million a year.

Finally, in many states where reinstatement fees were assessed against offenders, the amount of these fees received annually were nearly double the annual costs associated with the program. Clearly, ALS makes economic as well as administrative sense.

The final question which must be addressed when discussing the implementation of an ALS program is the question of constitutionality. In Pennsylvania, where a number of recent Supreme Court rulings have practically eviscerated the DUI and underage drinking laws, this is a particularly potent issue. In answer, it can only be said that, to date, all state court decisions regarding administrative suspension laws have ruled that such laws do not violate provisions of the United States or individual state constitutions.

In addition, the United States Supreme Court has ruled that suspension of a driving license prior to an administrative hearing is not a violation of due process so long as provisions are made for a swift post suspension hearing. The court went on to say that the summary and automatic character of the suspension was critical for the attainment of prompt removal of drunk drivers from the

highways, and, most importantly, for the safety of the public.

MADD Pennsylvania fully supports the implementation of administrative license suspension within the Commonwealth. We believe it makes sense -- judicially, economically, and administratively. We also believe it makes societal sense and common sense.

Thank you again for the opportunity to address this Committee on such an important issue.

CHAIRMAN LLOYD: Thank you.

Are there questions from members of the Committee? Representative Tigue.

REPRESENTATIVE TIGUE: Just a comment, and,

Ms. Walker, you may want to respond. Part of your

testimony says -- and this is one of the problems I have.

"The important point about this" -- this is your words.

"The important point about this process is that license suspension occurs regardless of the outcome of a criminal trial." And I think that is one of the major deficiencies in this proposal; that if I am stopped by a policeman, for whatever reason he deems necessary, and I am found not guilty, I have suffered a penalty for which I didn't commit a crime.

MS. WALKER: I guess I would have two comments about that. The first one is there is such a thing called

statistical morality, and that is the good of the majority must outweigh the good of the few.

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I don't think that anyone can argue the fact that currently if you give thousands of children whooping cough vaccine, there will be approximately 100 kids per year that will end up ill or sick from that vaccine, that we would not dream of not giving them that whooping cough vaccine.

So I do feel very strongly that while there may be an argument for that, that we have to think in terms of the good of the majority.

The second point of that, I do feel that it has been upheld in the Supreme Court, not just nationally but also in all the states where it has been challenged, that it is completely separate from either the criminal or the civil case; and, therefore, it is a completely separate item we're talking about here. It is much simpler.

You have been found guilty of driving under the influence of alcohol because you either refused the test, or you blew over a .10, and it is determined administratively to be guilty, which is separate from the criminal part of it, which does require preponderance of the evidence.

REPRESENTATIVE TIGUE: I don't think it's unconstitutional. I wouldn't hold that it is unconstitutional. But I do think that in Pennsylvania we

have a system which does the same thing as ALS or ALR, whichever system you want to call it, except the only difference we have is that there is a delay in adjudicating the case. I don't think that anyone, whether they're guilty or not guilty, should suffer because we have a system that has a backlog which they're not able to handle.

If you drive under the influence and your license is suspended, that's fine, that's what it should be. In Pennsylvania we do that. We do many of the things the film mentioned and Mr. Sweedler testified on ALS except for that time period. And, again, we're not doing it immediately because we're giving somebody 30 days to go out and do whatever they want legally with the permit. We're not taking their license — let me put it this way, more correctly. We are not suspending their right to drive immediately. We are allowing them to continue to drive.

So I don't understand how that can be a valid argument when we're giving the person a permit to drive, to operate tomorrow the same as they did today while they were intoxicated.

MS. WALKER: I admit I'm not a psychologist, but I think statistics have ruled that people in general do respond -- the quicker that the punishment is to the action that is considered punishable, the more apt they are to connect those two.

I know I have a lot of phone calls that come in from 2 DUI offenders, that come into our office, and they 3 complaint, "That was nine, ten months ago when I did that. I have worked hard. I have done this; I have done that to

try to change my behavior.

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So I do think people do have a tendency to look for a closer correlation between their punishment and their behavior.

It's not fair."

REPRESENTATIVE TIGUE: I have the opposite in my experience, as someone who handles maybe 150 pieces with PennDOT a week, and I have people who come into my office for all kinds of suspensions; and most of the people want to have it done immediately, especially kids who are college students so that they can have it done while they're in school, so they can work during the summer, things of that nature.

I think it's a case of individuality where sometimes it helps me to get suspended during the winter, sometimes it may help me to get suspended during the summer. Obviously, if I have a job which requires me driving it makes no difference, because I'm going to lose, at least for a temporary period, my ability to earn a living.

MS. WALKER: I would just conclude something that your colleague did bring up, and that is the fact that often licenses are not being turned in. This ALS bill

would eliminate that problem. You would begin to see the licenses turned in.

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REPRESENTATIVE TIGUE: But I think you missed his point. His point was, by not turning your license in, it causes you more trouble. You don't get away with a suspended license by not turning it in. In fact, your suspension is extended. Because when you receive notification from PennDOT to turn your license in, let's say on October 1. your suspension begins on October 1. Τf you don't turn the license in, you're driving under suspension. If you turn the license in on November 1, that's when the time starts counting for your service, the time you must serve. So if you don't turn the license in, his point was, it doesn't help the person, it's a hinderance to the person, because it extends the period under which they would drive under suspension. Also, it causes them more complicated problems.

So the problem is, if you don't turn your license in, it's a problem for you, not for the state or for anyone else.

MS. WALKER: I just know that there are an awful lot of people out there driving under the influence, and we must do something about it. This has been shown to be one of the strongest deterrents --

REPRESENTATIVE TIGUE: That's why we passed the bill

in 1982.

MS. WALKER: I think ALS has been shown to be one of the strongest deterrents that we have, and it's been approved and upheld in 31 states. Mothers Against Drunk Driving would like to see ALS here in Pennsylvania. We think we need it.

CHAIRMAN LLOYD: Other questions?

REPRESENTATIVE FAIRCHILD: Just a quick comment. I think, on the psychology of this thing, your statement, "Any elementary school teacher will tell you that the most effective way to maintain order and discipline in the classroom is to insure that any necessary punishment is administered swiftly and uniformly," I think where a lot of us are coming from is that that may be true in the classroom, but what many of us feared was going home to our parents later on in the day, and that punishment or whatever is usually much more long-lasting, even though it was not directly at the point of the infraction.

I think that's where I have some problems understanding that this quick process would be better than maybe the longer process, certainly not the way it is now. I think we can all agree that we've got major time delay problems. But I'm just not sure in this manner this is the exact, correct Bill that we should be pursuing.

One last quick question. The Interlock devices,

has MADD studied those and the effectiveness of those?

MS. WALKER: MADD does not currently have a position on Interlock devices as of this date. We have found that there have been some studies that are beginning to trickle in, and we will begin to develop a position on that.

We do have some concerns about the cost, which are obvious, but, also, this would enable the person then to go ahead and pick another car and drive that vehicle; and plus the expense here, when you're talking about a family, most people are multi-car families, so to speak, and I believe that a person who is thinking in terms of drinking and driving -- who is thinking in terms of being able to drive an automobile after he has been intoxicated, will perhaps still go look for a car and drive that vehicle.

REPRESENTATIVE FAIRCHILD: But they would be driving in violation.

MS. WALKER: They're still driving that vehicle. Where without a driver's license --

REPRESENTATIVE FAIRCHILD: Well, the same way now.

I mean they can drive without a license.

MS. WALKER: I don't think you can mandate that the person has to put Interlock devices on all of their cars.

REPRESENTATIVE FAIRCHILD: No. I'm not saying that.

MS. WALKER: And I think you will find that more people will be apt to slip over and drive another vehicle

than drive without a license, unless in some way you're going to also mandate that they may not drive any other car.

Those are things that I'm sure willing to sit and talk about, but I don't see a way to make that work based on what I've seen with the Interlock devices in other states. But we do not have a position as of this time.

CHAIRMAN LLOYD: A question and a comment. The question is: let's assume that we enacted this legislation and someone gets apprehended and he's at the administrative hearing. Should that person, in your opinion, be allowed to challenge the accuracy of the test?

MS. WALKER: I would have to defer to the people here from the National Traffic Safety Board to know whether that is allowable in other states and how it is handled in other states.

CHAIRMAN LLOYD: As a matter of philosophy, a matter of policy, when we considered this Bill a couple months ago, I supported it; in other words, I made a motion to report the Bill out of Committee. I believe that administrative suspension is a good idea. But I'm just trying to make clear on the record, and, certainly, in my mind it has to be open for the driver to say, "Wait a minute," number one, "I'm not the guy. You've got the wrong person." Number two, "They didn't do the test right,

and here we've got the logs to show that they didn't do the test right."

MS. WALKER: But I don't know -- and I have to be honest with you. I don't know what exactly is determined to be a reason why that administrative hearing officer would not support it administratively. Do they in other states allow a person to try to make the claim that that breathalyzer device was not functioning, or is that not allowable doing it administratively?

MR. SWEEDLER: Mr. Chairman, may I comment? CHAIRMAN LLOYD: Yes.

MR. SWEEDLER: Certainly. I think at the administrative hearing, was there probable cause for the officer to make the arrest? In other words, you can't just stop somebody for another reason and then find that maybe they're intoxicated and put them through the whole process. There had to be reasonable cause, the person is weaving down the road, driving at night without lights, some reason to suspect an impaired driver. That's number one. And was the test conducted properly, or did they not take the test? And if they did take the test, did they fail it?

I mean you're correct --

CHAIRMAN LLOYD: That's what I assumed. I just wanted to make sure that when we say that they blow across and it's .10 and above, you know, that doesn't meet

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elemental basic due process, and that makes Mr. Mancke's argument for him that you are just trying to stampede the justice and not allowing people their rights.

MS. WALKER: That's why I needed some help with the clarification.

CHAIRMAN LLOYD: My comment would be that it's been over 20 years ago when I did this, but when I studied criminal law, there was a concept that we would deter all kinds of criminal conduct much better in this country if we did not delay between the time we apprehend somebody and the time we take them to trial; and that we have gotten so accustomed to the mind-set that there should be a big interregnum between arrest and trial that it's kind of hard to come to grips with the notion that we could actually -we've got the evidence when the evidence is most accurate, we've got all the bodies when they're most available; let's have at it and let's get it settled. I mean what purpose is served, other than to let the evidence get cold, let witnesses become unavailable, and to disjoin the connection between the crime and the punishment, what purposes is served by giving the guy three months, six months, eight months, before we bring him to trial.

So I think your point is well taken, and there is a body of scientific study which suggests that that's valid.

Representative Tigue,

 Mr. Sweedler about you can't stop someone without cause and then find out that they're DUI. Well, in Pennsylvania we do that. We are allowed to have roadblocks, and it's been upheld, my understanding is, so we do stop people not because we thought they were impaired, just because we set up a roadblock, and we then arrest them for DUI. So it isn't only a question of stopping someone for probable cause.

MR. SWEEDLER: Some states don't allow administrative revocation at roadblocks.

REPRESENTATIVE TIGUE: But the point is, we do.

CHAIRMAN LLOYD: The point to be made is not what the specifics are, but it has to be in compliance -- whatever the state says with regard to a legal stop, this has to meet that definition. We're not suggesting that we're repealing administrative due process.

Are there any other comments or questions?
(No response.)

CHAIRMAN LLOYD: Thank you very much.

The final witness this morning is Mario Pirritano, who is Deputy Secretary of Transportation.

MR. PIRRITANO: My text says good morning, but since we're so close to lunch I'll say good afternoon. I'll be as swift as I think administrative license revocation can

be.

Let me first introduce, to my left, Doug Tobin,
Director of the Bureau of Driver License, Tom Bryer,
Director of Center for Highway Safety, and John Heaton, our
Chief Counsel.

Bear with me. I'm suffering from a cold, pneumonia, and probably a fever at this point in time.

Thank you for the opportunity of testifying before you. My testimony today will focus on two areas. First, I will present a general background, and I will outline specific problems the Department finds with the language in House Bill 1942, Printers Number 2342.

Many of these concerns have been addressed in Amendment A2187, which was previously submitted to the Transportation Committee.

Current state law does not always provide a rapid or a certain method of withdrawing the driving privileges from a person who drives a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol.

Convictions, in criminal court, are not always fast and certain in drunk driving cases. A backlog of cases in the court may mean a delay of many months before the criminal charges come to trial. Also, in many cases charges are being avoided altogether through plea bargaining.

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 The Department is only able to impose license sanctions upon receipt of the conviction from the court. As a result of protracted proceedings within the criminal court system, currently, the average time between the date of violation and the effective date of suspension where a person has been convicted for driving under the influence is 10 to 11 months.

Not infrequently, the time frame between violation and conviction exceeds two years. For those persons placed in an ARD program for DUI offenses, the time period between violation and suspension dates average eight to nine months.

As a result of administrative delays in submitting reports to the Department for those drivers who refuse to submit to chemical testing at the time of their arrest for DUI, the one-year suspension under Section 1547 of the Vehicle Code takes effect on an average of three to four months after the DUI incident.

In order to deter drunk driving and to provide a better connection between the illegal act and its consequences for the persons, a means, a more efficient process, if you will, is needed to get drunk drivers off the highways quickly.

One solution is to provide for administrative license suspensions without waiting for an offender to be

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 convicted in court, that is, Administrative Per Se License Suspensions. In order to reduce crashes, the immediacy of a sanction is as important as its severity.

Currently, 31 states have adopted administrative per se license suspension laws, and research indicates that these programs are effective in reducing DUI-related accidents.

According to estimates based upon a National Highway Traffic Safety Administration study of administrative license suspension laws, states can achieve a six percent reduction of single vehicle nighttime fatal crashes. Also, according to an Insurance Institute for Highway Safety study, states can achieve a nine percent reduction in fatal crashes during periods of high alcohol involvement.

In terms of yearly savings in Pennsylvania, NHTSA calculates, based on 1990 Fatal Accident Reporting System data, 44 to 66 lives would be saved. In Pennsylvania \$5 million to \$8 million would be saved in direct costs, such as medical, property damage, emergency services, insurance administration and legal and court costs.

This would mean \$30 million to \$45 million could be saved in societal costs. These costs reflect lost productivity and direct costs.

Congress has long recognized the importance of administrative license suspension to deterring drunk

 driving. Federal funds have been appropriated for states that adopted administrative license suspension along with other DUI counter measures.

If Pennsylvania enacts an administrative license suspension program, the Commonwealth would be eligible for federal incentive grant funds under the Section 408 Program.

Pennsylvania can only qualify for the 408 incentive funds if we meet two specific criteria: (1) Prompt license suspension, by federal definition, within 45 days from the date of arrest, and (2) a mandatory minimum period of license suspension for a first offense of 90 days.

Each of these provisions are included in House Bill 1942 and must be retained. According to NHTSA officials, the federal 408 incentive funds currently available will lapse within the next two years. The total 408 funds estimated to be available to the Commonwealth from the federal government are \$2.34 million in federal fiscal year '93 and \$2.34 million in federal fiscal year '94.

These funds are prorated only among the states that qualify for the federal monies, and are available upon implementation of the program.

The Department supports the concept of administrative per se and its objective of reducing the terrible toll of needless death by reducing the occurrences

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of driving under the influence.

Administrative per se is certainly feasible; however, the program will require an investment of approximately \$1.2 million for initial implementation. addition, the Department recommends changes to house Bill 1942 to minimize costs and to improve its effectiveness.

These changes are based on information we obtained from other states, NHTSA, The American Association of Motor Vehicle Administrators, and PennDOT's Chief Counsel's Office.

One of the critical problems with the legislation as it is now written is that this legislation provides for administrative license suspension for persons who fail the alcohol test but not for those who refuse to take it. Otherwise, individuals requested to submit to testing will realize that if they take the test and the test shows they are under the influence of alcohol, their privileges will be suspended almost immediately; but if they refuse to take the test, by tying the matter up in the courts, they may be able to delay any suspension for a very long period of time, and may, indeed, be able to avoid the suspension entirely.

This legislation needs to include those who refuse as well, in order to close that potential loophole.

Also, although this Bill appears to be an

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administrative per se bill which would speed up the suspension process, because appeals would be provided pursuant to Chapter 7 of the Administrative Code, this Bill would actually obstruct and slow down the process, because once the Departmental administrative hearing was over, the individual would have a right to appeal all over again to the Court of Common Pleas under the provisions of Section 1550 of the Vehicle Code and obtain an automatic supersedeas.

If this Bill is to be effective, the language of the bill must be changed so that the administrative hearing takes the place of the hearing before the court and is not merely an additional step that must be taken before that court hearing can be held. Any further appeal must be directly to the Commonwealth Court.

In addition, start-up time is critical. The 90-day effective date in this Bill will be impossible to meet. The Department would require a minimum of 12 months due to reprogramming of our driver license computer system, hiring and training of appropriate staff, training of the Commonwealth's law enforcement officers, and acquisition of hearing sites involved with this program. This legislation should not take effect until at least one year after enactment.

Given the costs associated with the program, I

recommend that the abuser and not the taxpayer -- and I underline that -- not the taxpayer, be responsible for funding the program. This legislation provides only for a hearing filing fee equal to court costs; however, we recommend that the approximately \$3 million required for ongoing operational costs be funded through a \$100 hearing filing fee and an additional \$50 restoration fee.

We recommend that the restoration fee be increased at the time of passage of the legislation in order to help fund a portion of the implementation costs.

The hearing should be removed from the provisions of Pennsylvania's Administrative Agency Law. Without this change, a stenographic record of the proceedings must be kept.

The cost to the Commonwealth for stenographic records would exceed an additional \$1.5 million a year. We recommend that the hearing be taped, and if a stenographic record is required, the offender should pay for the transcription service. This has been used very successfully in other states.

This legislation should be amended to require pickup and submission of administrative review and hearing
requests to designated offices. An administrative review
should be conducted prior to the effective date of
suspension if received within eight days following service

of suspension.

Given this Bill's existing language, forms could be picked up and delivered, and reviews conducted at Department facilities and critical processing time would be lost. Also, it is not administratively reasonable to conduct administrative interviews/reviews on a walk-in basis, which this Bill would allow.

In addition, hearings should be held at a location designated by the Department. The Department must have this option due to the significant administrative costs associated with hearing sites.

The temporary driving permit should be valid for at least 30 days instead of 10 days, and the time frame for the effective date of suspension should be increased to at least 30 days. The Department needs at least 30 days to schedule and conduct the hearing.

California currently utilizes 35 days. Also, the hearing should be held as quickly as practicable, and the Department should issue a temporary license if the hearing cannot be scheduled within 30 days.

Finally, in order to conform with the current vehicle code, the word "revocation" should be replaced by the word "suspension" throughout this Bill. A revocation requires the driver to apply for a learner's permit in order to be restored.

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 Also, these periods of suspension should be determined by whether the person's driving record shows prior alcohol-related or drug-related offenses during the immediately preceding seven years, not five years as stated in this Bill. It must be seven years so that it matches the prohibition found in Section 3731(e) against a person being admitted to ARD if he had another offense within the preceding seven years. Otherwise, individuals whose last offense was between the five years provided in this Bill and the seven years already in the law will be encouraged to tie up the criminal justice system because of the ninemonth difference in suspension between the suspension imposed under this Bill and that imposed because of a conviction under the current law.

Additionally, for consistency, the minimum suspension for ARD should be 90 days.

In closing my testimony, I wish to reiterate the Department's support for the concept of administrative license suspension. A Pennsylvania administrative license suspension law could produce a six percent reduction of single vehicle nighttime fatal crashes and a nine percent reduction in fatal crashes during periods of high alcohol involvement.

In yearly savings, Pennsylvania would save 44 to 66 lives, \$5 million to \$8 million would be saved in direct

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costs, and \$30 million to \$45 million saved in societal

To maximize the effectiveness of a Pennsylvania administrative license suspension law, and to minimize its cost, it must include: administrative license suspensions for not only persons who fail the alcohol test but for those who refuse to take it; provisions for the abuser, not the taxpayer, to be responsible for funding the program; removal of hearings from the provisions of Pennsylvania's Administrative Agency Law: a minimum of 12 months start-up time.

In addition, we are concerned with the availability of adequate funding of our implementation costs.

I would be happy to make my staff available to work with you in refining the specific language of this bill to ensure that the program will be successful.

Thank you for affording me the opportunity to appear before your Committee and to provide this testimony.

CHAIRMAN LLOYD: Thank you. I have a number of questions.

You say on page 3 of your statement, if I'm understanding it correctly -- and maybe I'm not -- that suspensions today occur, on average, within three to four months after the incident. Is that accurate?

VOICE: Refusal.

 CHAIRMAN LLOYD: Only in the case of a refusal?

MR. PIRRITANO: A refusal.

CHAIRMAN LLOYD: What is the average length of time if somebody has failed the breathalyzer test, what is the average length of time until there is actually a suspension?

MR. PIRRITANO: Ten to eleven months.

CHAIRMAN LLOYD: Now, you also made a pitch for making this system self-supporting. I agree with that in theory.

Is it your intention that the restoration fee for people who do not have a DUI conviction or a DUI case, administrative suspension or anything involving DUI, that that restoration fee also be raised from \$25 to \$50?

MR. PIRRITANO: It is not.

CHAIRMAN LLOYD: The amendment which you have presented to us appears to do precisely that where it says that if you're driving something else, and for some other reason you lose your license, the restoration fee is going to be raised to \$50. That's on page 9 of your amendment.

MR. PIRRITANO: That was the amendment provided to you under separate cover earlier?

CHAIRMAN LLOYD: A2187. That issue came up last year in the last session where the Department tried to raise the restoration fee across-the-board to \$50, and we

rejected that.

MR. PIRRITANO: Let me clarify that statement. I said no, it was not the intent, but this was prior to my tenure that this was sent, and evidently it was the intent.

CHAIRMAN LLOYD: Obviously, I can't speak for anybody else, but we visited this issue before. We rejected that point. If the argument is that this should be a self-supporting system, there is no justification then to bootstrap out and take other people who, for whatever reason, have had their license suspended and make them pay for it as well.

MR. PIRRITANO: The point is well taken.

CHAIRMAN LLOYD: On the same point, I am somewhat concerned that we have a system here that imposes fines, and imposes on top of the fines an EMS charge, a CAT Fund surcharge, court costs, and that what we're doing, if we actually counted all of the fine money that we collect from people who have DUIs, that we would have enough money to pay for this system; that the only reason you need additional fees is because that money is now going to do other things in the Department.

Subject to check -- and my guess is, if you look at the numbers, that is exactly what it shows.

My experience is that an awful lot of people who have these offenses are never going to be able to pay the

fines. And I'm wondering if to make this self-supporting it wouldn't be more sensible to say that all of the fine money, and all the restoration fee money, which is currently being collected from people with a DUI-type incident, is diverted into a special fund, a restricted fund, to pay for this program.

I recognize that that might be \$3 million or \$5 million, or whatever it is, that's not available to patch potholes or do something else, but rather than coming back and -- the Department is probably already collecting enough money to pay for this program. Rather than coming back and imposing additional charges, it seems to me it would be more intellectually honest to sequester the money we already have and use it for that purpose.

MR. PIRRITANO: I understand what you're saying, and I cannot specifically state that the money is -- and "divert" would probably be the wrong term -- being utilized elsewhere. But I think the dedication of this source would be palatable.

CHAIRMAN LLOYD: Also, I recognize that we want these hearings to cost as little as possible, and if you make a stenographic record, that's expensive, and that may not be necessary, and that the lion's share of these cases are probably going to be lost. I am wondering, however, if a defendant successfully appeals, whether it would not be

appropriate for the Commonwealth to reimburse him the cost of the stenographic record, or, if either -- well, the record would be relevant only on appeal to the Commonwealth Court.

But it just strikes me -- I realize this is an administrative proceeding, not a criminal proceeding, but that goes back to case law 30 years ago in criminal law where it was viewed as a great advance in constitutional rights, that if you were convicted criminally, that the government was going to pay for a transcript.

MR. PIRRITANO: I think there may very well be some precedent for that in the Department.

John, would you want to speak to that?

MR. HEATON: No. I don't know of any other situation where the Department assesses the transcript costs. Now, in the administrative docket matters, we have recently reflected in the filing fees the costs of transcripts. The filing fees have recently been increased.

I think the minimum filing fee now for an administrative proceeding in front of our hearing judge is \$100, which reflects the additional cost of the transcript.

CHAIRMAN LLOYD: For the record, you are?

MR. HEATON: John Heaton, Chief Counsel, PennDOT.

CHAIRMAN LLOYD: The final point that I wanted to raise is that I also appreciate the need to bring everybody

to Harrisburg to have a hearing, and I support this idea.

I have some concerns, however, that this really is -- I
mean we're saying, "Well, we're going to give you a
hearing, but," just as somebody previously said, "you know,
there's not really much point of having one because we know
how it's going to come out," and make the guy come to
Harrisburg.

Here's a guy who can't afford to take a day off work, not going to hire a lawyer to come down to Harrisburg, and by saying this all has to be in Harrisburg or some central location, whether in Pittsburgh or Philadelphia, that does impose a burden, and it is basically imposing a price for my appealing even though I believe that the police officer was wrong.

MR. PIRRITANO: I don't think that's what we're saying here, and that's not the expectation. I believe we will have hearing officers throughout the state at various locations.

CHAIRMAN LLOYD: Other questions from members of the Committee?

Representative Tigue.

REFRESENTATIVE TIGUE: In your testimony you mention three to four months for someone who refuses to take a blood or breathalyzer.

What percentage of people don't appeal that? And

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how long does that take? If I just say, "Okay" -- you get information from a police department saying I failed to take a breathalyzer. How long does it take to process that suspension?

MR. PIRRITANO: It's about two-thirds, but what's the time frame?

MR. TOBIN: For which, for when they do appeal?

REPRESENTATIVE TIGUE: For when they don't appeal.

MR. TOBIN: When they don't appeal. That would be, generally, three to four months.

REPRESENTATIVE TIGUE: See, that's the point. The point is that it takes three to four months and there's no administrative hearing or anything. Why, then, would we even contemplate doing this if right now PennDOT -- if I am stopped out here by the Harrisburg police and they submit to you that I refused the breathalyzer, it takes three to four months, based on what you said, it takes three to four months to get back to me to tell me I'm suspended. Why, then, do we think it's going to be faster under this system when there's no hearing, there's no administrative law judge, there's nothing except you processing the information from the police department.

MR. TOBIN: We process the paperwork. Keep in mind that within that three to four-month period you've got that -- we have a built in 35-day due process appeal period

before the suspension takes effect.

REPRESENTATIVE TIGUE: Okay. That would reduce it from three to four to two to three months.

But the point is, it takes three months to process something where I've already pled guilty, and I don't even want an administrative hearing.

CHAIRMAN LLOYD: No.

REPRESENTATIVE TIGUE: Yes.

CHAIRMAN LLOYD: In this instance, though, isn't the answer to that question that the temporary license is going to run out, and so it doesn't require, once that time has run, it doesn't require the Department, unlike the case that Representative Tigue is talking about, it doesn't require the Department to do anything else. Isn't that where the savings come?

MR. TOBIN: Yes. Plus ---

REPRESENTATIVE TIGUE: No.

REPRESENTATIVE HESS: The temporary license is only good for 30 days.

CHAIRMAN LLOYD: That's right. At the end of 30 days, PennDOT doesn't have to do anything; the person no longer has a license, period.

REPRESENTATIVE TIGUE: But the point is -- and all I've heard this morning is that the reason for doing this is because of the delay in the judicial proceedings that we

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 have. What I'm saying is we have a system in place now for various offenses, including one of refusing to take a breathalyzer, or that you can't blame the judicial system for the backup. You just are notified that I'm guilty and it takes -- even at that point it takes three to four months to suspend my license, with no hearing, with no cop involved, with no one taking my license.

Why should I then believe, under any scenario, that it is going to be faster with an administrative law judge when now you don't even have one, it's just me to you?

MR. TOBIN: Because with this Bill you would have a built-in time period. You've got 30 days for the temporary license. The activity takes place in 30 days.

REPRESENTATIVE TIGUE: Or you can extend it.

MR. TOBIN: Or you can extend it. If, for some reason, you schedule a hearing and we are unable to meet that date, then we would extend it, at least that's what we propose to do.

REPRESENTATIVE TIGUE: But that puts me, as the operator, at risk. Not the Department, me, as the operator.

MR. MUSTIN: Representative Tigue --

CHAIRMAN LLOYD: Would you identify yourself for the record?

MR. MUSTIN: Bob Mustin, Legislative Liaison for

PennDOT.

Right now the law does not prescribe any time for that police department who is submitting the refusal, any time frame in which it has to be submitted to the Department, so you may have some police department that is as quick as, you know, within a week, and you may have others that take two months to get it in, and longer even. That's why the average time that has been quoted here is three to four months.

REPRESENTATIVE TIGUE: Let's use another scenario under the current law. You're notified by an insurance company that I dropped my insurance on my vehicle. How long does it take to get a plate picked up and processed? Because, automatically, I am suspended from the time you're notified.

If my insurance company notifies PennDOT that I have a registration with no insurance, you're supposed to suspend my license, I'm supposed to be notified, et cetera, and we go through this. How long does it take to do that?

MR. TOBIN: That's about 90 days to 120 days.

REPRESENTATIVE TIGUE: Before what, Doug, before you notify me?

MR. TOBIN: No, no; before the suspension takes effect.

REPRESENTATIVE TIGUE: How long does it take you to

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 notify me?

MR. TOBIN: It is rather instantaneous with the receipt of information from the insurance company if they provide it on computer tape. We process the tape. Within a week we've got the letter out to you.

REPRESENTATIVE TIGUE: Okay, I will accept that.

What happens if I'm driving -- and there's a provision in this amendment -- and I say I don't have a driver's license; do you issue me a temporary license?

MR. TOBIN: Within this provision?

REPRESENTATIVE TIQUE: Within this amendment, yes.

MR. TOBIN: You're out driving --

REPRESENTATIVE TIGUE: I'm out driving, I'm stopped for DUI, and I say I don't have a license with me. Do you then issue me a temporary license?

MR. TOBIN: Under the law, the person has so many days to show up and present their license or the officer would also cite them for driving without a license.

REPRESENTATIVE TIGUE: Under the amendment, if the amendment goes into effect, if I'm driving and I get stopped and I say I don't have a license, do I get issued a temporary permit at that point?

MR. TOBIN: You will be issued a suspension notice by the officer, which takes effect --

REPRESENTATIVE TIGUE: I'm talking about right on

the spot. You're talking about taking someone's license when you're stopped. I'm saying you stop me and I say I don't have a license with me.

MR. TOBIN: In other states what they will do is they will tell the person that they have got to show up within a certain period of time, usually within a couple of days, show up with their license in hand. At the time they surrender it, then they're issued a temporary license. Or if for some reason the license has been lost or so on, then they must certify that it has been lost, and you go from there with a temporary license.

If they don't have a license whatsoever, then they are not issued a temporary license, obviously.

REPRESENTATIVE TIGUE: So if I don't have my license with me, I'm not issued a temporary license; obviously, I can't turn it in. Then I'm allowed a couple of days to go get my license and turn it in?

MR. TOBIN: Yes.

MR. MUSTIN: The amendment provides that if your license is not taken by the police officer, you will be notified by the department as to your administrative hearing and all those details, and your license would then ultimately be turned in as it is today.

REPRESENTATIVE TIGUE: I understand that. My question was do I get a temporary permit?

MR. MUSTIN: No, you will not. If the officer doesn't serve you with a suspension, you will not get a temporary permit. He will not serve you with a suspension if you do not have a license to turn in.

REPRESENTATIVE TIGUE: What made me think of this was a statement Representative Lloyd made before about identity. Mike Carroll can verify this. We just had a situation where one of my constituents received a notification from PennDOT that his license was suspended because he failed to respond to a citation. When I contacted PennDOT they said, "Yes, this is the operator number, this is his name." They gave me an address which was about 120 miles from where he lives.

Ironically, the person who was stopped for the infraction evidently knew this guy's name and date of birth. It wasn't him. What happened was, the magistrate then sent out a citation to the address which was given when the person was arrested under this guy's name and operator's number. The policeman never -- and it was a State Policeman -- never required the person to come back in and show proof of his license.

As a result, a policeman comes to the place of business and says, "I'm here to pick up your license." He says, "For what? I've never been notified. What are you talking about?"

 This is a situation which has happened. I mean, these things occur. How do we prevent that from happening? If I say: I don't have my license. I'm Bob Mustin. My date of birth is whatever.

MR. PIRRITANO: Clearly, I think if this is approved we would have to train our people to ensure that these kind of things would not happen. Even at that, you're probably going to have the isolated incident that will occur, just like the infamous Mr. Smith in Philadelphia who we had listed as dead, which, by the way, the State Police had notified us of that. So we would certainly make every effort to ensure there are no abuses.

REPRESENTATIVE TIGUE: That doesn't solve the problem though. I would imagine you are making efforts now, but still, because of the volume of individuals, not only the pieces of registrations or infractions but we keep extending the layers, and that's my point; if we have more people involved in the process, we're apt to make more mistakes.

What happens currently if an out-of-state driver -for instance, a Pennsylvania driver is picked up in a state
which has ALS or ALR, say, Maryland. If I'm driving to
Baltimore this afternoon, I'm intoxicated, I get stopped by
the Maryland State Police, what happens?

MR. TOBIN: It varies, and it really almost varies

on the police officer who picks you up. Although the other state really does not have a right to take that license from another state, it does happen and they will take the license; they would take the Pennsylvania license.

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In some instances they send it back to us, and then we return it to the driver. In all instances they would file a DUI charge against that driver, and they would have to appear in court in the State of Maryland, go through the criminal process; and Maryland, at the end of it, would levy a suspension against that driver for operation within the State of Maryland.

REPRESENTATIVE TIGUE: But it doesn't apply to Pennsylvania?

MR. TOBIN: It does not apply to Pennsylvania at this time.

REPRESENTATIVE TIGUE: How could it apply to Pennsylvania?

MR. TOBIN: How could it?

REPRESENTATIVE TIGUE: Yes.

MR. TOBIN: If we entered a compact with the State of Maryland, then that could apply.

The situation is different for the State of Delaware where we do have a bilateral compact with them. If you are convicted of the offense of DUI in the State of Delaware, we will then take a suspension against your Pennsylvania

driver's license.

REPRESENTATIVE TIGUE: You will take a suspension based on the Delaware law?

MR. TOBIN: Yes.

REPRESENTATIVE TIGUE: I don't have any other questions.

CHAIRMAN LLOYD: Are there any other questions?

REPRESENTATIVE FAIRCHILD: A couple.

CHAIRMAN LLOYD: Representative Fairchild.

REPRESENTATIVE FAIRCHILD: The seizure of license, when a policeman seizes a license and issues the temporary permit, how long does the police department or the officer have to forward the information to the Department?

MR. LANDIS: Forty-eight hours, I think it is.

REPRESENTATIVE FAIRCHILD: Is it addressed in the bill? I didn't see it.

MR. PIRRITANO: Not the bill. It's in the amendment.

MR. HEATON: Section 4 says, "The police officer shall transmit to the Department, along with the report under paragraph one, a copy of the complete notice of suspension form, a copy of any completed temporary permit and driver's license." So there is no time frame.

REPRESENTATIVE FAIRCHILD: I think you're going to have to address that time frame, because you've got very

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tight time frames for the -- you've only got 30 days to make this thing run, so you've got to put something in

MR. PIRRITANO: I don't know if it was addressed in the amendment or not, but we'll certainly follow that up.

REPRESENTATIVE FAIRCHILD: It is not in the

On page 5, "If the Department determines that the person is not subject to suspension, the Department shall notify the person of its administrative determination, shall rescind, " et cetera, et cetera.

What is an example of the Department determines that the person is not subject to suspension given that there is a temporary license given?

MR. TOBIN: Representative Fairchild, it would be many of the same things we talked about here earlier. It would be an improper arrest, improper finding of -improper test results.

REPRESENTATIVE FAIRCHILD: So this is before the hearing process and everything else, that section?

MR. TOBIN: Yes.

REPRESENTATIVE FAIRCHILD: So that's kind of a first review the person would get?

> MR. TOBIN: Right.

REPRESENTATIVE FAIRCHILD: Again, I just question:

 how long will the Department take; in what form will they rescind it and how long will it take to get back to the driver? That's just a comment.

MR. PIRRITANO: I would like to maybe bring up a question. You were concerned about the individual abrogating their rights legally.

John, you might want to speak to that. I think there might be some --

REPRESENTATIVE FAIRCHILD: I don't have any further questions on that.

MR. PIRRITANO: I'm sorry.

REPRESENTATIVE FAIRCHILD: Any idea on the number of hearing sites that would be available to the citizens?

Following up on Representative Lloyd's questions.

MR. PIRRITANO: I'll let Mr. Tobin speak on that in more detail, but as we take the Department forward, particularly with licensing and decentralization -- and I will just speak very briefly -- people want customer service, they want one-stop shopping, so it's going to have to be reasonably convenient.

We do have a budget laid out and the number of people that we would require, but I can't tell you specifically the locations, but certainly within reason.

REPRESENTATIVE FAIRCHILD: On the hearings it says,
"The Department shall provide written notice of the time

and place of the hearing to the person requesting the hearing at least ten days prior to the scheduled hearing."

I understand that.

Then it says, "It shall be the responsibility of the person challenging the suspension to arrange for the attendance of any witnesses, including the law enforcement officer who submitted the sworn report."

Is that fair to give somebody ten days -- if I receive it today, I've got a hearing in ten days -- to now go out and request that the law enforcement officer be there, any other witnesses? I assume that there may be some subpoenas possibly involved in here. What happens if -- I get complaints from my boroughs and law enforcement agencies that they are cutting down on personnel, their budgets are tight. One of their complaints is they are always ending up in hearings and that messes up their shifts and that type of thing.

MR. PIRRITANO: I'm not sure ten days is unreasonable, but if it is, there is some latitude for adjustment, and I'll defer to John on that.

MR. HEATON: It can be extended under the language, I believe.

REPRESENTATIVE FAIRCHILD: Yes. That's up to the hearing officer. I think that opens up a whole nother issue of extending this thing when, obviously, the intent

was to get it over with, bang.

I just wondered how many other -- are our courts filled up because of similar extensions where the one attorney has another date, the law enforcement officer is on vacation? Are we adequately fixing the problem at hand, or are we just putting a band-aid on an already-existing --

MR. PIRRITANO: Certainly, it's a very complex issue, I'm sure, but in doing all the analysis here I'm told that perhaps our legal staff could be reduced by several or more -- am I correct, John -- because of the time they're now spending appealing and dealing with the courts.

REPRESENTATIVE FAIRCHILD: Just one last comment on the decision. "The hearing and the cost of transcription service shall be borne by the Department. The decision of the hearing officer shall be rendered in writing and provided to the person who requested the hearing." I would like to request that you put a time frame in there so that we have it in black and white, somebody can't say, "Well, it was mailed 30 days ago." If we have it in statutory language, then each party will know the time frame.

Thank you.

CHAIRMAN LLOYD: Any other questions?

(No response.)

CHAIRMAN LLOYD: If not, thank you very much -- oh,

I'm sorry.

REPRESENTATIVE TIGUE: One other question I just thought of, and maybe Doug knows the answer to this.

An administrative hearing now, if I go to an administrative hearing now for cumulative points or habitual offender, from the time the hearing ends to the time my license, if it is going to be suspended, what is that time?

MR. TOBIN: Including your due process time, you're probably looking at 60 days, would be my guess.

REPRESENTATIVE TIGUE: Thank you.

MR. TOBIN: विव्यवसम्बद्ध कृष्य सिस्ट सेमेस स्वेतीत तथ अपूर्णकी our determination.

CHAIRMAN LLOYD: I would like to thank all the people who participated this morning. We will be, as soon as we get a transcript, forwarding that to the full Committee so that the members of the Committee have an opportunity to review it and determine what direction we want to go on this legislation.

The meeting is adjourned.

(Whereupon, at 12:25 p.m., the meeting was adjourned.)

CERTIFICATE

I hereby certify, as the stenographic reporter, that the foregoing proceedings were taken stenographically by me, and thereafter reduced to typewriting by me or under my direction; and that this transcript is a true and accurate record to the best of my ability.

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